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PREAMBLE
New York's Freedom of Information Law, like its federal
counterpart, the Freedom of Information Act, is designed to provide the
public with access to government records, within a framework that
allows for denial of that access where a record falls within any of a
handful of specified exemptions. It has been this author's experience,
however, that all too much confusion abounds regarding the operation of
the statute, sometimes resulting in wasteful litigation at the expense of
taxpayers and private parties alike, and sometimes resulting in a
dangerous failure to assert or even recognize an appropriate exemption in
a given case. Following the 1996 Court of Appeals decision cited in the
title of this article, that confusion has taken a turn for the worse, it seems,
and has given rise to the problems and concerns described hereunder.
This article is thus presented in an attempt to shed light on a
sometimes difficult subject. It is hoped that the analysis it contains will
become a useful resource, both to the government attorneys charged with
defending against the inappropriate-and sometimes dangerous-
disclosure of records, as well as to the busy judges who must preside
over such proceedings. It is also hoped that this article will prove useful
to potential litigants in such cases and to their counsel, since a better
understanding of this area of law may help to ensure that only truly
meritorious claims reach the courthouse. It is presented, additionally, to
provide an overview of one of the more contentious issues arising under
the Freedom of Information Law, and one which has long called for
guidance. Fortunately, that guidance exists-one just needs to know
where to look for it.
One additional point must be made regarding the title of this article:
"Gould Debunked." Like the name of the statute with which we are
herein concerned, the Freedom of Information Law, this article's title is
somewhat of a misnomer. Contrary to what its name suggests, the
Freedom of Information Law does not provide access to "information,"
but to records (there is a difference). Similarly, the title of this article is
not meant to suggest that the Court's decision in Gould needs to be
debunked. To the contrary, as will be shown, it is the frequent
misinterpretation of Gould which requires the debunking. Hopefully,




New York's Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") 1 imposes upon
governmental agencies a broad duty of disclosure regarding agency
records. Accordingly, all agency records are presumptively available for
disclosure to the public unless they fall within one of ten enumerated
exemptions.2 Thus, in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to compel
production of records where, based upon one of those exemptions, the
agency has denied access to records reasonably described in a written
1. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84 et seq. (McKinney 1988).
2. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2). This subdivision provides that an agency may
deny access to records or portions thereof that:
(a) are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute;
(b) if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
under the provisions of subdivision two of section eighty-nine of this article;
(c) if disclosed would impair present or imminent contract awards or collective
bargaining negotiations;
(d) are trade secrets or are submitted to an agency by a commercial enterprise or
derived from information obtained from a commercial enterprise and which if
disclosed would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of the
subject enterprise;
(e) are compiled for law enforcement purposes and which, if disclosed, would:
i. interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings;
ii. deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication;
iii. identify a confidential source or disclose confidential information relating
to a criminal investigation; or
iv. reveal criminal investigative techniques or procedures, except routine
techniques and procedures;
(f) if disclosed would endanger the life or safety of any person;
(g) are inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not:
i. statistical or factual tabulations or data;
ii. instructions to staff that affect the public;
iii. final agency policy or determinations;
iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the
comptroller and the federal government; or
(h) are examination questions or answers which are requested prior to the final
administration of such questions.
(i) are computer access codes.
(j) are photographs, microphotographs, videotape or other recorded images
prepared under authority of section eleven hundred eleven-a of the vehicle and
traffic law [Eff. until Dec. 1, 2004].
3. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1994).
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FOIL request, the agency bears the burden in that proceeding of proving
entitlement to any applicable FOIL exemption.4 Although FOIL is in part
predicated upon the public's right to access, 5 the Legislature's
incorporation of these ten exemptions into the statute is based upon its
recognition of the dangers and injustices that absolute access to
government records may entail, and the policies underlying them are
equally important to the sound governance and protection of society.
6
These policies are of special concern to law enforcement agencies,
because the nature of law enforcement often involves such agencies-
more so than most-with sensitive and confidential records, such as
those created pursuant to a criminal investigation.
On November 26, 1996, New York's Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in Gould v. New York City Police Department,7 holding that a
particular New York City Police Department ("NYPD") form, known as
a Complaint Follow-Up Report (also known in the NYPD lexicon as a
"DD5," this form is the principal instrument utilized by NYPD
investigatory personnel to record the progress of police investigations),
was not entitled to "blanket" protection under one of FOIL's enumerated
exemptions.8 As the Court explained, "blanket exemptions for particular
types of documents are inimical to FOIL's policy of open government."
9
However the Court also briefly addressed, in dicta, another of FOIL's
4. See Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 566, 496 N.E.2d 665, 667
(1986) (citations omitted) ("[Tlhe agency seeking to prevent disclosure carries the burden
of demonstrating that the requested material falls squarely within a FOIL exemption
..."); see also Laureano v. Grimes, 179 A.D.2d 602, 603, 579 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1st
Dep't 1992). Parallel citations to New York official reporters have been inserted at the
request of the author, who intends this article to be a resource for New York practitioners
and courts, as well as legal scholars.
5. SeeN.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84, 89(4)(b).
6. See, e.g., Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 571, 393 N.E.2d 463, 465 (1979)
("While the Legislature established a general policy of disclosure by enacting [FOIL], it
nevertheless recognized a legitimate need on the part of government to keep some
matters confidential."); Floyd v. McGuire, 87 A.D.2d 388, 390-91, 452 N.Y.S.2d 416,
417-418 (1st Dep't 1982) (the legislative policy underlying FOIL's exemptions must be
given equal consideration as that given to the policy underlying disclosure); Delaney v.
Del Bello, 62 A.D.2d 281, 405 N.Y.S.2d 276 (2d Dep't 1978) ("Sensitivity to the
public's right to know [under FOIL] ... should not and cannot be permitted to eclipse the
realization that government functioning involves a healthy mixture of practicality. Too
healthy a dose of disclosure could bring the wheels of government to a grinding halt.").
7. 89 N.Y.2d 267, 675 N.E.2d 808 (1996).




exemptions-one which precludes disclosure where records are
otherwise "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal
statute" (hereinafter, the "Statutory Exemption").10 There the Court
noted, simply, that Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 (which governs
the criminal discovery process)" is not a statute which falls within that
exemption.
Although entirely tangential to the issues before the Court, this dicta
has, to a great extent, overshadowed the actual holding in Gould and has
been propelled into the consciousness of the defense bar, some of whom
have attempted to portray it as sanctioning the unfettered use of FOIL-
through records requests made to prosecutors, police departments, or
other law enforcement agencies-to circumvent the Criminal Procedure
Law's restrictions on criminal discovery. The "campaign" for this
interpretation has been mounted despite the absence of any language in
the dicta (or anywhere else in the decision) which might appear to justify
it, and despite the existence of another FOIL exemption which clearly
has direct application to requests for records implicated in a criminal
discovery context. Found at New York Public Officers Law section
87(2)(e), this additional exemption pertains to records which are
compiled for law enforcement purposes which, if disclosed, would result
in any of four prescribed dangers (hereinafter, the "Law Enforcement
Exemption"). One of those dangers, enumerated at section 87(2)(e)(i),
emerges where disclosure would interfere with law enforcement
investigations or judicial proceedings (the "interference provision" of the
Law Enforcement Exemption; hereinafter, the "Interference
Exemption").
But, until recently, little clear appellate guidance as to the
Interference Exemption's application in response to attempts at using
FOIL as a discovery tool has emerged in the three-plus years since Gould
was decided.' 2 This may be, in large part, due to the fact that discovery-
10. 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 812.
11. See N.Y. Cgim. PRoc. LAW §§ 240.10, et seq. (McKinney 1993).
12. See Pittari v. Pirro, 179 Misc. 2d 241, 683 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1998), affd
258 A.D.2d 202, 696 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2d Dep't 1999), leave denied, 94 N.Y.2d 755, 723
N.E.2d 567 (1999) (where, prior to affirmation by the Second Department, Supreme
Court had observed that none of the reported appellate cases dealing with FOIL had
addressed the applicability of N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(i)-the Interference
Exemption-to a pending criminal prosecution). The Second Department's 1999
affirmation of Pittari constitutes the first appellate precedent directly on point as to this
issue. Accord, Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st
Dep't 2000), appeal denied, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 3925 (N.Y. Dec. 21, 2000) (where the
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type records are ultimately obtained anyway under Criminal Procedure
Law Article 240 either before a FOIL request proceeds to the litigation
stage, during the pendency of FOIL litigation (thereby rendering the
dispute moot),13 or prior to the need for either party to appeal an adverse
decision in a FOIL case. Moreover, the general requirement of making a
particularized showing in order to meet the burden of proof for
withholding records under the exemption 14 may be perceived as requiring
an agency resisting disclosure to prove-separately for each paragraph of
each document-that disclosure would cause a specific harm, short of
which no relief from disclosure may be had.a5 Although that perception
as to FOIL's burden may have had its own part in discouraging agencies
from even attempting to properly avail themselves of this important
exemption, 16 any such perception is sorely misplaced. In fact, as will be
shown, nothing could be further from the truth.
This article will demonstrate that, based upon FOIL's legislative
history as a parallel statute to its federal counterpart, the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"), 17 both FOIA's case law and its own
legislative history apply to FOIL as well. This connection is especially
salient as to the Interference Exemption 18 contained in both statutes, in
court, inter alia, concurred with Pittari as to this issue). See also infra notes 328-30, 333
and accompanying text; cf Sideri v. Office of the District Attorney, 243 A.D.2d 423, 663
N.Y.S.2d 206 (lst Dep't 1997) (where the court touched on the applicability of that
exemption to a pending criminal appeal); see also infra note 332 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Pordum v. Nyquist, 42 N.Y.2d 958, 367 N.E.2d 647 (1977); Newton
v. Police Department of New York, 183 A.D.2d 621, 624, 585 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (lst Dep't
1992) (where the relief sought is obtained during the pendency of an Article 78
proceeding, that proceeding is moot).
14. See infra Part IV.C.2 for discussion as to the particularized showing
requirement.
15. See infra notes 328-30 and text accompanying note 204 (Congress's rejection
of this perception under FOIL's federal analogue, the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1994)); see also Pittari, 179 Misc. 2d at 241, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
16. New York State Assembly Bill number A-6131, which had been urged by the
New York District Attorney's Association, and was introduced by Assemblypersons
Seaman and Wirth in 1997, sought to protect DD5s and police officers' memo books
from disclosure under FOIL, pending the termination of a criminal proceeding. The bill's
conception was apparently based upon the concern that Gould had done away with the
only "clear cut" avenue of protecting such records in a pre-discovery context.
17. See supra note 15.
18. Unless otherwise noted, this term will be used to describe the FOIL provision
found at N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(i). Where it is used in reference to the
corresponding FOIA provision, that reference will be made clear.
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that Congress's amendment of FOIA's version of that exemption was
followed shortly thereafter, in virtual lockstep, by New York's
amendment to FOIL's corresponding provision (as will be seen, that
FOIL's version adhered closely to both the language and structure of its
FOIA analogue indicates a strong legislative intent to mirror the function
and purpose of FOIA's version of the exemption). This article will then
provide an analysis of the cases construing FOIA's Interference
Exemption, and will further demonstrate that it is well settled that the use
of FOIA-and therefore of FOIL-as a discovery tool in a criminal
proceeding19 is exactly the type of interference contemplated by both
versions of the exemption and is impermissible where the exemption has
been raised. Finally, this article will set forth the actual nature of the ill-
defined and often misunderstood evidentiary standard required to sustain
an exemption under FOIL and, further, will demonstrate that the proffer
of generic "categories" of both harm as well as of records suffices to
meet that standard under the Interference Exemption.
II. THE MECHANICS OF FOIL: A BRIEF PRIMER
FOIL directs that, within five business days of receiving a written
request for a record reasonably described,20 an agency subject to FOIL's
provisions2 shall either: 1) make such record available to the requestor;
2) deny the request, in writing; or 3) furnish a written acknowledgment
of the receipt of the request, inclusive of a statement of the approximate
19. Although the same analysis applies with equal force to any judicial
proceeding. See infra notes 218 & 241 and accompanying text.
20. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89(3); Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 68 N.Y.2d 245, 501
N.E.2d 1 (1986) ("the requirement ... that documents be 'reasonably described' was to
enable the agency to locate the records in question" citing, with approval, National Cable
Tel. Ass'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 479 F.2d 183, 192 (D.C.C. 1973) for the
proposition that a "plausible claim of nonidentifiability ... may be presented where
agency's indexing system was such that 'the requested documents could not be identified
by retracing a path already trodden."' Accord Wattenmaker v. N.Y.S. Employees'
Retirement Sys., 95 A.D.2d 910, 464 N.Y.S.2d 52 (3d Dep't 1983); Gannett Co. v.
James, 86 A.D.2d 744, 447 N.Y.S.2d 781 (4th Dep't 1982); cf. M. Farbman & Sons v.
New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75, 464 N.E.2d 437 (1984); Mitchell
v. Slade, 173 A.D.2d 226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Ist Dep't 1991).
21. "'Agency' means any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division,
commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other
governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or
any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature."
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 86(3).
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date upon which the request will be granted or denied.22 Failure of the
agency to timely respond to an initial FOIL request, as set forth above,
may be deemed a constructive denial, thus triggering the requestor's
right to file an administrative appeal.23 Assuming that the requested
record exists and can be located, and that access thereto has not been
otherwise denied, the agency must provide access to the requested record
upon payment of the prescribed fee 24 and, if requested to do so, must
certify to its correctness. 25 Where applicable, the agency must certify that
it does not possess the requested record, or after a diligent search that the
record cannot be located.26 Except for those specified records which
FOIL itself requires the agency to create and maintain,27 the agency is
not required to prepare records which it does not possess or cannot
22. See id.
23. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(a); see, e.g., DeCorse v. City of Buffalo, 239
A.D.2d 949, 950, 659 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (4th Dep't 1997); Floyd v. McGuire, 87 A.D.2d
388, 390-91, 452 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417-18 (1st Dep't 1982). Note that, where the agency
does timely respond to a request for records by providing an estimate of the approximate
date upon which it will determine whether to grant or deny access, see N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW § 89(3), regulations which seek to place a limit on that estimate have been held
invalid as inconsistent with FOIL. See Lecker v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 157
A.D.2d 486, 549 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dep't 1990), appeal dismissed, 75 N.Y.2d 946, 554
N.E.2d 1280 (1990); accord Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, 713
N.Y.S.2d 3 (lst Dep't 2000), appeal denied, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 3925 (N.Y. Dec. 21,
2000).
24. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 89(3). The statute provides for a maximum fee of
twenty-five cents per page, though nothing in that provision precludes the agency from
waiving the charge. Note that the provision also specifies that access to records be
granted upon the requestor's "offer to pay." But the Committee on Open Government has
expressed the opinion that it is appropriate, at least in the context of a request involving
numerous records, for the agency to require payment in advance. See Committee on Open
Gov't, Advisory Op. No. 7201 (June 19, 1992), issued to Kevin A. Luibrand.
25. See N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 89(3).
26. Id; see also infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text (discussion of FOIL's
certification requirement). As to the requirement to search for a requested record, the
requirement is, of course, limited to the extent that the record is sufficiently reasonably
described, so as to allow for a search based upon the agency's record-keeping system.
See supra note 20. Based upon this criteria it is axiomatic that "secondary searches"--i.e.,
searches for additional records which the requestor may seek, that only come to light
based on references in the records initially retrieved - are not required under FOIL. See
Wattenmaker v. NYS Employees' Retirement Sys., 95 A.D.2d 910, 464 N.Y.S.2d 52 (3d
Dep't 1983) (responding agency not required to perform petitioner's research and
investigation).
27. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 87(3), 88(3).
[Vol. 44
GOULD DEBUNKED
locate.28 Additionally, FOIL does not apply to requests for physical
evidence,29 nor does it require the agency to provide answers to
- 30interrogatories. Moreover, a requestor's failure to respond to an
agency's solicitation for additional information required to address the
request is properly deemed an abandonment of the request.
31
Although a record may be exempt from disclosure under FOIL an
agency may, nevertheless, disclose that record, in whole or in part, as a
matter of discretion.32 Should the agency deny a FOIL request, it is
required to do so in writing. 3 FOIL does not require the agency, at this
stage, to explain the denial but only to certify 4 that it does not possess
the requested record or, pursuant to a diligent search, that the record
28. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAv § 89(3); Curro v. Capasso, 209 A.D.2d 346, 619
N.Y.S.2d 549 (Ist Dep't 1994); Ahlers v. Dillon, 143 A.D.2d 225, 532 N.Y.S.2d 22 (2d
Dep't 1988).
29. See, e.g., Allen v. Strojnowski, 129 A.D.2d 700, 700-01, 514 N.Y.S.2d 463,
464-65 (2d Dep't 1987); Sideri v. New York District Attorney, 243 A.D.2d 423, 663
N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1997).
30. See, e.g., Guerrier v. Hemandez-Cuebas, 165 A.D.2d 218, 219, 566 N.Y.S.2d
406, 407 (3d Dep't 1991); Gabriels v. Curiale, 216 A.D.2d 850, 851, 628 N.Y.S.2d 882,
883 (3d Dep't 1995) (cases holding, generally, that FOIL does not require an agency to
compile information it does not already possess in the form sought, for the purposes of
complying with a FOIL request).
31. See, e.g., Timmons v. Records Access Officer, 271 A.D.2d 320, 706 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1stDep't 2000) (Supreme Court's dismissal of petition seeking records under FOIL
affirmed, in that "[p]etitioner failed to meet his burden to supply the information required
to retrieve the requested documents"); Thomas v. New York Police Department, No.
402907/98, Decision and Order (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County October 30, 1998) (Article 78
petition dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, where requestor had failed to
supply additional information that the agency had solicited as necessary to processing his
FOIL request); accord Mitchell v. Slade, 173 A.D.2d 226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 437, leave
denied 78 N.Y.2d 863, 586 N.E.2d 60, 578 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1991) (holding that a requestor
of records bears the threshold burden under FOIL to reasonably describe the records
sought such that they can be located by the agency, and that the solicitation of additional
information in order to assist the requestor in making the request is not even within the
agency's duty).
32. See Hanig v. New York Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 588
N.E.2d 750, 752-53 (1992) (citing Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 567,
496 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1986)).
33. But see DeCorse v. Buffalo, 239 A.D.2d 949, 950, 659 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (4th
Dep't 1997) (failure to timely respond to a FOIL request within the allotted period is
deemed a constructive denial, thus triggering the requestor's right to take an
administrative appeal).
34. See N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAw § 89(3); see also infra notes 67-78 and
accompanying text (the limits of FOIL's certification requirement).
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cannot be located, if either is applicable.35 Thus, where a denial is based
upon an enumerated exemption, nothing in the statute requires the
agency, initially, to specifically say so (although it appears that most
agencies do). Upon denial (for any reason) by the agency, the requestor
may submit an administrative appeal, either to the agency head or to the
person designated to consider such an appeal 36 (the "Appeals Officer")
within thirty days of the date of the denial.37 Failure to timely appeal a
denial of records under FOIL will not only result in forfeiture of the right
to appeal, but will also preclude subject-matter jurisdiction if the
requestor then attempts to seek judicial review of the denial.38 Failure of
the designated Appeals Officer to respond to an appeal within ten
business days of receipt,39 however, may be deemed a constructive final
denial upon which the requestor, having thus exhausted FOIL's
35. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
36. Note that in Barrett v. Morgenthau, 74 N.Y.2d 907, 548 N.E.2d 1300 (1989),
the Court of Appeals held that the respondent's failure both to advise the requestor-who
had made his initial FOIL request to the agency head--of the availability of an
administrative appeal procedure, and to demonstrate to the court even the existence of an
administrative appeal procedure under FOIL, required the denial of the respondent's
dismissal motion which had included a claim that the petitioner had failed to exhaust
FOIL's administrative remedies. The requirement to inform a requestor of appeal
procedures was based upon the Rules of the Committee on Open Government, 21
NYCRR 1401.7(b). However, the Rules of the Committee on Open Government have
since been held invalid where they impose requirements not otherwise required by FOIL
itself. See Lecker v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 157 A.D.2d 486, 549 N.Y.S.2d 673
(1st Dep't 1990), appeal dismissed, 75 N.Y.2d 946, 554 N.E.2d 1280 (1990); accord
Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 2000),
appeal denied, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 3925 (N.Y. Dec. 21, 2000). Thus, as long as the agency
has indeed established a bona fide administrative appeal procedure, Lecker appears to
have rendered Barrett irrelevant. See Van Steenburg v. Thomas, 242 A.D.2d 802, 661
N.Y.S.2d 317 (3d Dep't 1997); DeCorse v. City of Buffalo, 239 A.D.2d 949, 659
N.Y.S.2d 604 (4th Dep't 1997); Floyd v. McGuire, 87 A.D.2d 388, 452 N.Y.S.2d 416
(lst Dep't 1982).
37. N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(a). The author is the Appeals Officer for the
New York City Police Department.
38. See Reubens v. Murray, 194 A.D.2d 492, 599 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1993);
Murphy v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 148 A.D.2d 160, 164-65, 543 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73
(1st Dep't 1989). But see Malerba v. Kelly, 211 A.D.2d 479, 621 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1st
Dep't 1995); Newton v. Police Dep't of City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 621, 624, 585
N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1st Dep't 1992) (in view of the respondents' laxity in not addressing a
petitioner's FOIL request until after commencement of an Article 78 proceeding, the
court permitted the petitioner to take an administrative appeal from a partial denial of
records despite the lapse of the 30-day administrative appeal period under N.Y. PuB. OFF.
LAW § 89 (4)(a)).
39. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(a).
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administrative remedies,40 may pursue an Article 78 proceeding to
compel disclosure. Of course, an actual written denial of an appeal, as
provided for by the statute, will also confer jurisdiction in an Article 78
proceeding.42 Moreover, it is only upon such written denial by the
Appeals Officer that any explanation is directed by FOIL, which requires
the agency to "fully explain" the reasons for denial of the administrative
appeal.43 Finally, the Appeals Officer must forward to the Committee on
Open Government copies of both the appeal and the determination
thereon.44
Note that it is the date of the letter of denial on appeal,45 or the date
of the constructive denial (i.e., the tenth business day after the agency
receives an appeal letter),46 which commences the statute of limitations
period of four months47 within which to bring an Article 78 proceeding.
It should be pointed out that requestors have sometimes been known,
after a failure to timely appeal a denial of a FOIL request, to make the
same request at a later date in the apparent hope that procuring a fresh
denial will renew their ability to take a timely appeal (which is a
condition precedent to subject-matter jurisdiction in an Article 78
proceeding, as is denial of the appeal 8). Such hopes, however, are
misplaced, as the right to maintain a judicial proceeding begins to accrue
upon the denial of the initial request-otherwise parties could extend the
statute of limitations indefinitely by renewing requests for materials
which have already been denied, in order to procure denial again49 along
with another chance to appeal.
40. See, e.g., Van Steenburg, 242 A.D.2d at 803, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
41. See infra note 45.
42. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(b); see also infra note 46 and accompanying
text.
43. See N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 89 (4)(a).
44. See id.
45. See Swinton v. Records Access Officer, 198 A.D.2d 165, 604 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1st
Dep't 1993); Laureano v. Grimes, 179 A.D.2d 602, 579 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st Dep't 1992).
46. See Van Steenburg, 242 A.D.2d at 802-03, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 317-18.
47. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 217(1) (McKinney 1990).
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Van Steenburg, 242 A.D.2d at 803, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 318; Pelt v.
Police Dep't of City of New York, 258 A.D.2d 382, 685 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1st Dep't 1999);
Mendez v. New York City Police Dep't, 260 A.D.2d 262, 688 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1st Dep't
1999); Corbin v. Ward, 160 A.D.2d 596, 554 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1990); Karaffa v.
Simon, 14 A.D.2d 978, 979, 222 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (3d Dep't 1961). Surprisingly,
however, the Committee on Open Government has, in at least one of its opinions, stated
2000]
NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW
Before proceeding further, two comments are in order regarding the
provision of FOIL that requires the agency to "fully explain" a denial
upon administrative appeal. 50 First, the language of that provision is
merely directory. 51 Therefore, if the agency fails to "fully explain" a
denial of records, it does not forfeit anything.52 In part, this stems from
the very nature of an Article 78 proceeding brought pursuant to FOIL
which is, by necessity, in the nature of mandamus to compel.53 In a
that a request for records which had been denied on the basis that was later rejected in
Gould, made by the same requestor after Gould was decided, should be accepted by the
agency because of Gould. See Committee on Open Government, Advisory Op. No. 10857
(June 15, 1998), issued to Nemesio Turull. But see Pelt v. Police Dep't of City of New
York, 258 A.D.2d 382, 685 N.Y.S.2d 687 (a change in decisional law cannot revive a
claim and, therefore, a FOIL request which is procedurally barred); cfBuffalo News, Inc.
v. Buffalo Enterprise Dev. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 488, 493, 644 N.E.2d 277, 280 (1994) ("the
advisory opinions of the Committee on Open Government are 'neither binding upon the
agency nor entitled to greater deference in an Article 78 proceeding than is the
construction of the agency' (John P. v. Whalen, 54 N.Y.2d 89, 96)."). As to Mr. Turull's
Article 78 challenge to the NYPD's statute-of-limitations-based denial of his FOIL
request, New York Supreme Court was apparently unimpressed with his argument that
Gould required reconsideration of his request and dismissed his petition. See Turull v.
Lombardi, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9447 (1st Dep't 1998) (decision without
published opinion).
50. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(a); see also supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
51. See N.Y. STATUTES § 171 (a provision is only mandatory if it is essential i.e.,
if it goes to the jurisdiction of the actor, and compliance is a condition precedent to the
validity of the act undertaken pursuant to the statute. In contrast, directory provisions are
mere instructions or directions, inserted for convenience, and an inexact compliance with
such provisions, or even their disregard, constitutes only an irregularity, not a fatal
defect). See e.g., Van Steenburg, 242 A.D.2d at 803, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 318; DeCorse v.
City of Buffalo, 239 A.D.2d 949, 950, 659 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (4th Dep't 1997); Floyd v.
McGuire, 87 A.D.2d 388, 452 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1982).
52. See, e.g., Floyd, 87 A.D.2d at 390-91, 452 N.Y.S.2d 417-18 (rejecting the
notion of such forfeiture as "too rigid," and "draconian," as well as violative of the
legislative policy represented by FOIL's exemptions which, the court noted, must be
considered. The court then specified that FOIL's requirement that the agency respond to
an appeal within the allotted time frame was "directory rather than mandatory," and that
the consequences of the agency's failure to do so was only that a requestor would be
deemed to have exhausted FOIL's administrative remedies, upon which he would be
entitled to seek judicial review).
53. See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801,
C7801:1-4, 7803, C7803:1-5 (McKinney 1994). See also, e.g., Buffalo News, 84 N.Y.2d
at 491, 644 N.E.2d at 278 (1994) ("[Petitioner] commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 78
proceeding to compel disclosure of the documents"); Russo v. Nassau County Coll., 81
N.Y.2d 690, 696, 623 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1993) (citations omitted) ("Petitioner commenced
this N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 78 proceeding seeking to compel respondents to grant him
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proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel, "the [challenged]
aggrievement does not arise from the final determination, but from the
refusal of the body or officer to act or perform a duty enjoined by law"
(such as the duty to provide access to records under FOIL).54 Thus, it is
not necessary-from a litigation standpoint-for an agency to have
established a reason for its denial, at the administrative level, in order to
defend against an Article 78 challenge which seeks to compel disclosure.
While the appropriate standard of review in a proceeding in the nature of
mandamus to review a prior administrative determination is whether that
determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion 55_
thus requiring that a reason for the agency's actions be established in
order to be tested against that standard-a proceeding to compel
disclosure, where the respondent's defense is that the record is exempt
under New York Public Officers Law section 87(2), turns on whether
that respondent can prove entitlement to any of FOIL's exemptions to
disclosure. 6 A FOIL respondent is thus not barred from raising grounds
for non-disclosure of records notwithstanding that those grounds were
not raised before at the administrative appeal level,57 and judicial review
access to" certain records under FOIL); Scott v. Records Access Officer of Syracuse, 65
N.Y.2d 294, 296, 480 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (1985) ("[P]etitioner brought an Article 78
proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel access to the reports pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Law"); Farbman & Sons, Inc v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75, 79, 464 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1984) ("[Petitioner] then commenced this
Article 78 proceeding to compel production [of records] in accordance with its request").
54. De Milio v Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216, 220, 433 N.E.2d 506, 507 (1982)
(quoting Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 N.Y.2d 430, 432, 158 N.E.2d 681, 687
(1959)).
55. See C.P.L.R. 7803(3); Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 313 N.E.2
321, 325 (1974).
56. See Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 566, 496 N.E.2d 665, 667
(1986); see also Laureano v. Grimes, 179 A.D.2d 602, 603, 579 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1st
Dep't 1992).
57. See Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES, 162 A.D.2d 967, 967-68, 557
N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (4th Dep't 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 77 N.Y.2d 753, 757-58, 573
N.E.2d 562, 565 (1991) (the rule that judicial review of an agency determination is
limited to the grounds invoked by the agency at the administrative level adheres only in
Article 78 proceedings involving writs of mandamus or certiorari to review those
determinations, and not writs of mandamus to compel). See also Gould, 89 N.Y.2d 267,
279, 675 N.E.2d 808, 814 (1996) (the Court, having found that the documents at issue
were not exempt under the intra-agency materials exemption invoked by the Police
Department, remitted the matter for determination as to "whether the Police Department
can make a ... showing that any [other] claimed exemption applies"); Scott, 65 N.Y.2d at
296, 480 N.E.2d at 1072. (In Scott, the respondent, having failed to raise sustainable
grounds-in fact, any grounds-for denial of disclosure at the administrative level, raised
2000)
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of the agency's denial is, therefore, de novo. Thus, omission of an
explanation as to denial by the Appeals Officer, full or otherwise, can
never be prejudicial to the agency's subsequent defense in litigation.S
a number of FOIL's exemptions to disclosure, for the first time, as defenses in the
ensuing Article 78 proceeding. All of the exemptions raised by respondent, though
rejected, were considered on the merits by Special Term. The Appellate Division
modified Special Term's decision, ordering further exemption of portions of the records
at issue, whereupon the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order.)
Note that, even where it does apply-such as in a proceeding seeking a writ of
certiorari or mandamus to review an administrative determination-the rule that limits
judicial review of a determination to the grounds invoked at the administrative level
should not be misconstrued as foreclosing the agency from raising additional grounds at
all. Instead, application of the rule may require remand in order to allow the agency to
create a record, based upon its consideration of the additional ground, for the court to
review. See, e.g., Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 57 N.Y.2d 588, 593, 443
N.E.2d 940, 942 (1982); Montauk Improvement Inc. v. Proccacino, 41 N.Y.2d 913, 363
N.E.2d 344 (1977); Barry v. O'Connell, 303 N.Y. 46, 100 N.E.2d 127 (1951) (cases
applying the rule, and then remanding to the respondent-agency to properly consider the
additional ground at the administrative level). See also See. & Exch. Comm. v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947) (apparently the seminal case from which the rule sprang
and which, after remand to the agency, explicitly rejected the position that the rule
granted a petitioner any vested right to benefit from an agency's initial failure to raise a
sustainable ground for its determination); accord Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at
814; Billups v. Santucci, 151 A.D.2d 663, 664, 542 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dep't 1989)
(although the Article 78 respondent failed to produce any evidence that the requested
documents fell within any FOIL exemption, the matter was remitted to determine which
documents were properly subject to disclosure); Moore v. Santucci, 151 A.D.2d 677,
677-78, 543 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (2d Dep't 1989) (although the Article 78 respondent's
stated reasons for denial were not cognizable under FOIL, the matter was remitted for a
de novo determination of petitioner's entitlement to the records at issue, in accordance
with the established rules governing FOIL disclosure).
58. See Sec. & Exch. Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 199-201; accord
Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814. Moreover, FOIL exemptions, by their
terms, are often temporary (for example, the Interference Exemption itself may cease to
apply where any potential investigations and judicial proceedings have run their course).
It is axiomatic, therefore, that exemptions not initially raised because they did not yet
apply, or because their applicability had not yet been discovered, may apply later,
especially where the records at issue arise from a dynamic process such as an
investigation. As agency business does not come to a halt simply because someone has
made a FOIL request, it would be an absurd result indeed if agencies were precluded
from asserting subsequent applicable exemptions simply because they did not emerge
until after the agency's denial on an earlier ground which had ceased to apply by the time
litigation had rolled around. See Floyd v. McGuire, 87 A.D.2d 388, 452 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1st Dep't 1982); DeCorse v. City of Buffalo, 239 A.D.2d 949, 659 N.Y.S.2d 604 (4 th




Second, the phrase "fully explain" is nowhere defined in FOIL.
However, contrary to the suggestions of some litigants, it certainly
requires something much less than a particularized showing,9 which is
an evidentiary creature and which, according to the Court of Appeals,
has no place outside of the litigation context. It thus cannot arise at the
administrative appeal level. Moreover, the particularized showing
requirement applies only to denials which are based upon one of FOIL's
enumerated exemptions.61 Thus, if denial is possible based upon reasons
other than a claim of exemption, then to "fully explain" should simply
require that the agency identify that reason. And denial is indeed
possible for a variety of reasons other than exemption. For instance,
New York Public Officers Law section 89(3) provides for three grounds
for denial outside of section 87(2): 1) that the requested record was not
reasonably described; 2) that the agency does not possess the requested
record; or 3) that the requested record cannot be located after a diligent
search; section 89(5) provides for the exception from disclosure of
information submitted to a state agency62 by any person acting pursuant
to law or regulation;63 and section 89(7) provides for non-disclosure of
the home address of an officer, employee, former officer or employee of
a public employees' retirement system, as well as of several other
categories of persons. 6" Moreover, if the reason is that the record is
subject to one of the enumerated section 87(2) exemptions, it should not
59. See infra Part IV.C.2.
60. See Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 566,496 N.E.2d 665, 667.
61. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2); Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811
(requiring the agency to articulate the necessary showing in order "to invoke one of the
exemptions of[N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW] section 87(2).") (emphasis added). See also N.Y.
PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(b), which only places the evidentiary burden of proof on an
agency, in an Article 78 proceeding, when the agency invokes one of the exemptions
found at § 87(2).
62. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(5)(h) for the definition of a state agency under
FOIL.
63. Note that, pursuant to the procedure set forth in this section, the burden of
proof under N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(b) still applies if the information falls within the
provisions of §§ 87(2)(d) and 89(5)(0; otherwise, the agency decision to except
information from disclosure under this section is unreviewable. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§§ 89(4) (a) & (b).
64. Still additional grounds may be that the request is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata or is duplicative of an earlier request which was denied, see, e.g., Pelt v. Police
Dep't of City of New York, 258 A.D.2d 382, 685 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1st Dep't 1999), or is
moot, see, e.g., Moore v. Santucci, 151 A.D.2d 677, 543 N.Y.S.2d 103 (2d Dep't 1989),
among others.
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even be necessary to identify the particular exemption (in some cases,
declining to include such specificity may simply be a necessity so as not
to reveal, or even hint at, confidential information contained in
records65). Therefore, where denial is based on a claim of exemption,
simply stating that records "are exempt pursuant to N.Y. Public Officers
Law section 87(2)," or something of that nature, should be sufficient to
"fully explain" the reasons for denial within the meaning of New York
Public Officers Law section 89 (4)(a).6
While on the subject as to what an agency is and is not required to
articulate under FOIL, some clarification is in order, as well, regarding
FOIL's "certification" requirement. As set forth above, an agency is
required to provide written certification where it does not possess a
requested record, or where, pursuant to a diligent search, a record cannot
be located.67 FOIL does not prescribe the specific form of the
certification, leaving such to the discretion of the agency providing it.
Moreover, the requirement, like the requirement to "fully explain" the
reasons for denial on appeal, is strictly directory.68 It appears, in fact, that
the requirement serves no other purpose than to apprize the requestor that
denial of a record is based upon nothing more than the agency's inability
to locate it (perhaps to save the requestor from needlessly pursuing the
requested item in an Article 78 proceeding). Thus, satisfaction of the
requirement should be deemed complete, simply upon the agency's
official written response to the requestor representing that it either does
not possess the record, or cannot locate it. It need not be in affidavit
form, nor must it provide any details of the search conducted (if one was
required), or state a legal position, or use the word "diligent." Neither
must the representation regurgitate the wording of the statute, nor contain
any other talismanic language, as long as the message is clear. This was,
in fact, the view of the Court of Appeals in Gould, when it upheld the
65. See, e.g., Nalo v. Sullivan, 125 A.D.2d 311, 312, 509 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (2d
Dep't 1986) (petitioner in an Article 78 proceeding need not be informed of the
underlying facts concerning withheld records, even in litigation, where disclosure of such
information could effectively subvert the purpose of the exemption).
66. Moreover, where an agency proffers this construction of the term "fully
explain," unless it were found to be "irrational or unreasonable, [it] should be upheld."
Ostrer v. Schenck, 41 N.Y.2d 782, 766, 364 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (1977) (citing Howard v.
Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 271 N.E.2d 528, 529 (1971)).
67. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89(3); see also supra notes 34 & 35 and
accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 51 & 52.
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dismissal of petitioner Harold Scott's 69  claim that the Police
Department's response to his FOIL request had been insufficient to
certify its inability to locate some of the records he sought.70 This
becomes truly apparent, if not solely based on the Court's language, then
upon a reading of the Police Department's brief-in which its response
to Scott's FOIL request was described-to which the Court's language
was responding:
The Police Department's Records Access Officer stated, in
response to Scott's FOIL request, "A search of our records
indicates that we have accessed all documents located relative to
your request" [ ] .... A responding agency should not have to list
each item requested and make a particularized statement relating
to each, if the response to each is the same, which is that it is
unavailable. It is not necessary, moreover, that talismanic
language be iterated to demonstrate the non-availability of
requested materials, if a plain statement is made that the agency
has no responsive documents.71
Thus, Scott's argument that "[b]ecause the NYPD did not certify the
negative results of a complete records search, or state a legal position
regarding allegedly exempt documents, its response did not constitute a
proper certification by the FOIL Records Access Officer of a diligent
records search with negative results... ''72 was wholly rejected by the
Court.73 All that is therefore required for an agency to certify that it does
not possess a requested record, or, after it has conducted the requisite
diligent search, that it cannot locate a record, is notice from the agency
constituting its official response to the requestor and containing a plain
statement that it has no documents responsive to the request (or to a
particular portion of the request, as the case may be). In fact, the practice
69. Harold Scott was one of the three petitioners whose Article 78 proceedings
were consolidated and decided sub nor Gould v. New York City Police Dep't Gould,
therefore, consists of three cases: Gould v. New York City Police Dep't, 89 N.Y.2d 267,
675 N.E.2d 808 (1996); Scott v. New York City Police Dep't, 89 N.Y.2d 267, 675
N.E.2d 808 (1996); DeFelice v. New York City Police Dep't, 89 N.Y.2d 267, 675 N.E.2d
808 (1996). See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 675 N.E.2d at 810. Note that the petitioner
in Scott was the same individual who had brought Scott v. Chief Med. Exam'r, 179
A.D.2d 443, 577 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1st Dep't 1992).
70. See id. at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814.
71. See id. (Respondent's Brief at 35-36).
72. See id. (Appellant Scott's Brief at 21).
73. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814.
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of the NYPD at the time of Scott's, request-which was to simply
reference the documents that were found pursuant to the search, and
specify that those documents constitute all records responsive to the
request which could be located by the agency-is sufficient to meet this
requirement.
74
Scott's failure to comprehend that this result was inevitable points up
a basic flaw in the approach of many FOIL petitioners, which is to
assume that FOIL is somehow above and beyond the reach of the basic
principles of administrative law, against which the behavior of
government agencies is measured. For instance, under the well-settled
"presumption of regularity" 75 that attaches to governmental actions, an
agency's representation that it could not locate documents will carry the
presumption that the required diligent search had been conducted prior to
making the representation, even where the agency does not specifically
74. See id. Moreover, in order to refute the agency's representation, a petitioner
must, by more than mere speculation or conjecture, "articulate a demonstrable factual
basis to support [the] contention that the requested documents exist and [are] in the
[agency's] control." Id. See also Almonor v. Rosenberg, 237 A.D.2d 168, 655 N.Y.S.2d
361 (1st Dep't 1997); Pennington v. McMahon, 234 A.D.2d 624, 650 N.Y.S.2d 492 (3d
Dep't 1996); DiRose v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 216 A.D.2d 691,
627 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't 1995); Wood v. Ellison, 196 A.D.2d 933, 602 N.Y.S.2d 237
(3d Dep't 1993); Mitchell v. Slade, 173 A.D.2d 226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Ist Dep't 1991);
Corbin v. Ward, 160 A.D.2d 596, 554 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1990). But what exactly
satisfies the evidentiary burden of articulating a "demonstrable factual basis?" The
burden is a formidable one. Petitioners have proffered everything from newspaper
articles, which appear to refer to the existence of sought-after records, to the agency's
own documents, which appear to do the same (which is what Scott did). However, even
Scott's claim, that the records he sought must exist because of the references made to
them in other police department documents, was deemed "conjecture" by the Court of
Appeals. See Appellant Scott's Brief at 20; Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814.
75. "There is a presumption of regularity with respect to government agencies in
that it is presumed they 'act honestly and in accordance with law and do nothing contrary
to official duty nor omit anything which official duty requires to be done.' (Fisch, New
York Evidence § 1134.)." Abrahams v. New York State Tax Comm'r., 131 Misc.2d 594,
500 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1986); see also Gae Farms, Inc. v. Diamond, 40 A.D.2d 909,
909, 337 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (3d Dep't 1972) (citing Taub v. Pimie, 144 N.E.2d 3, 5-6, 3
N.Y.2d 188, 195 (1957)) (agencies are not required "to affirmatively prove compliance
with required procedures.. .Administrative actions are presumed to have been regular
absent the rebuttal of the presumption of regularity."); see also Thomas v. Town of
Bedford, 29 Misc.2d 861, 214 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (citing RICHARDSON,
EVIDENCE § 71 (8th ed. 1948) for the presumption of regularity attending official acts);
see also FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENC E, § 3-120 (1 1th ed. 1997) ("This
presumption compels the adversary to come forward with affirmative evidence of




say so to the requestor.76 There is simply nothing in FOIL's language to
suggest the suspension of this well-settled principle. Of course, a failure
to conduct a search where required77 would indeed constitute a failure to
comply with a material requirement of the statute. However, it is simply
not necessary for an agency to recite every step it takes in the course of
compliance with one statute or another-at least not prior to litigation,
and even then, not unless a petitioner advances a demonstrable factual
basis upon which to question the agency's compliance with that statute.
78
76. Other petitioners have attempted to make an argument similar to Scott's-that
the agency's clear and unambiguous representation is insufficient to meet FOIL's
certification requirement. A Second Department case that petitioners sometimes raise in
support of this argument is Key v. Hynes, 205 A.D.2d 779, 613 N.Y.S.2d 926 (2d Dep't
1994), where the court required the agency to proffer an affidavit as to the diligence with
which the search for records had been conducted. However the court in Key ordered the
affidavit only after it found that the respondent's conflicting representations had raised an
issue of fact as to the claim that the records could not be found, noting that "[u]nder the
unusual circumstance of this case, we cannot agree with [the respondent's] argument"
that the record at issue could not be located. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Key is not
inconsistent with Gould as to this result. To the extent it is, it should be deemed overruled
(by Gould), as should be Thomas v. Records Access Officer, 205 A.D.2d 786, 613
N.Y.S.2d 929 (2d Dep't 1994) (where the court had required an affidavit from someone
with personal knowledge as to the search, though no "demonstrative factual basis" by
which to challenge the agency's representation had first been advanced). A recent post-
Gould decision by the First Department, however, relying on Key, held that neither the
letter of the Records Access Officer, nor the affirmation of the Police Department
attorney who had reviewed the agency file, were sufficient to meet FOIL's certification
requirement. See Rattley v. New York City Police Department, 270 A.D.2d 170, 706
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1st Dep't 2000), leave to appeal granted, 716 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't
2000). This is especially surprising since, in Gould, the Court of Appeals was upholding
the First Department's determination that the Police Department's certification practice
under FOIL had been proper. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814.
Nevertheless, pursuant to Gould, the Court of Appeals has already considered and
squarely decided this very issue. See, e.g., People v. Bourne, 139 A.D.2d 210, 216, 531
N.Y.S.2d 899, 902-903 (Ist Dep't 1988) (citing Empire Sq. Realty Co. v. Chase Nat'l
Bank, 181 Misc. 752, 43 N.Y.S.2d 470, affd 267 A.D. 817, 47 N.Y.S.2d 105, leave
denied 267 A.D. 901, 48 N.Y.S.2d 325 ("A case ... is precedent as to those questions
presented, considered and squarely decided.")).
77. Note that a search is not always necessary. For example, it is not required
where the request fails to reasonably describe the record requested. See Konigsberg v.
Coughlin, 68 N.Y.2d 245, 501 N.E.2d 1 (1986); see also Mitchell v. Slade, 173 A.D.2d
226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't 1991) (FOIL places the threshold requirement upon a
requestor to reasonably describe a record so that the agency can search for it).
78. See, e.g., Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279, 675 N.E.2d at 814 (1996); accord Calvin
K. v. DeFrancesco, 200 A.D.2d 619, 608 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1994); Mitchell v.
Slade, 173 A.D.2d 226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't 1991); Ahlers v. Dillon, 143 A.D.2d
225, 226, 532 N.Y.S.2d 22,23 (2d Dep't 1988).
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Finally, where denial of a FOIL request is based upon one of the ten
exemptions enumerated in section 87(2) of the N.Y. Public Officers Law,
then section 89(4)(b) of the statute places upon the agency the burden,
during litigation, of proving that the record falls within the scope of an
exemption.79 Although a proceeding in the nature of mandamus to
compel normally requires that the petitioner bear the burden of
establishing a clear legal right to the relief sought,80 that burden is
automatically met based upon FOIL's legislatively declared presumptive
availability of public access.81 Section 89(4)(b) appears simply to
recognize that fact, and thus shifts the burden to the agency at the outset
of litigation. Therefore, as to an exemption-based denial, z a petitioner in
a FOIL Article 78 proceeding need merely demonstrate that she has met
all of FOIL's threshold mechanical requirements (i.e., that the agency
denied a written request reasonably describing a record, and further
denied such request upon timely administrative appeal) in order to state a
claim. 3 No "argument" by the petitioner is actually necessary unless and
until the agency is able to meet its section 89(4)(b) burden in its
answering papers because, until then, the petitioner's right of access is
79. That the agency's burden of proof is limited both to the litigation context and
to the invocation of one of the exemptions specified in N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2) is
made clear by the language of N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(b) itself, which states, in
pertinent part: "[a] person denied access to a record ... may bring a proceeding for
review of such denial pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.
In the event that access to any record is denied pursuant to the provisions of subdivision
two of section eighty-seven of this article, the agency involved shall have the burden of
proving that such record falls within the provisions of such subdivision two." (emphasis
added). See also Capital Newspapers, 67 N.Y.2d 562, n.566, 496 N.E.2d 665, n.667
(1986) (citations omitted) (where the Court of Appeals specified that both FOIL and its
interpretive case law "speak only of the agency's burden of proof when its denial of
disclosure to a FOIL applicant is challenged in an article 78 proceeding") (emphasis
added); see also Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811 (citations omitted) ("[To
invoke one of the exemptions of section 87(2), the agency must articulate 'particularized
and specific justification' for not disclosing requested documents") (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Association Ct. Reporters v. Bartlett, 40 N.Y.2d 571, 357 N.E.2d 353
(1976) (citations omitted) (success in a proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel
requires a showing of a 'clear legal right' to the relief sought ... [which] must be so
clear as not to admit of reasonable doubt or controversy.").
81. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (MeKinney 1988).
82. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2) (McKinney 1988).
83. This is why there is no harm where the requestor is not apprised, prior to
litigation, of the particular exemption relied upon by the agency. See, e.g., supra notes
51-54 and accompanying text.
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presumed s4 and her reasons for seeking the record are irrelevant.s5 If and
when the respondent's burden is met, however, the petitioner will not
prevail unless she can somehow refute the agency's response. Where
denial is based on other than a section 87(2) exemption, then the section
89(4)(b) burden upon the agency does not apply, and the FOIL petitioner
should (generally) bear the initial burden of proof to the same extent that
any other Article 78 petitioner would.
86
M. BACKGROUND
In 1992, Scott v. Chief Medical Examiner,87 the Appellate Division,
First Department, unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of
petitioner Harold Scott's Article 78 challenge to the NYPD's denial of
his FOIL request for various agency records. In its decision, the court
concluded that the records at issue, "including DD5s are interagency
material, which are not final agency policy or determinations, and are
exempted from disclosure under FOIL by N.Y. Public Officers Law
section 87(2)(g)(iii) ... ,,88 The decision also found that police officers'
84. See, e.g., Scott v. Records Access Officer, 65 N.Y.2d 294, 296, 480 N.E.2d
1071, 1073 (1985) (citing Farbman & Sons v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 62
N.Y.2d 75, 79-80,464 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1984)).
85. This is generally so. See id.; cf. John P. v. Whalen, 54 N.Y.2d 89, 99, 429
N.E.2d 117, 122 (1981). However, as to N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 87(2)(b) (FOIL's
"Personal Privacy Exemption"), for example, a requestor's reasons for seeking a record
can indeed be relevant to the propriety of the exemption. Thus, in Scott the release, to a
personal injury law firm, of the names and addresses on motor vehicle accident reports,
where the firm had stated its intent to use such list for direct mail solicitation of accident
victims, was deemed an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW § 87(2)(b) (which exempts from disclosure, inter alia, lists of names to be used for
commercial purposes). See Scott, 65 N.Y.2d at 299,480 N.E.2d at 1074.
86. See supra note 77; see also FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EvIDENCE § 3-
210 (1 lth ed. 1995).
87. 179 A.D.2d 443, 577 N.Y.S.2d 861 (lst Dep't 1992).
88. Id. at 444, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 862; N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(g)(iii), protects
from disclosure materials which are "inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not
... [inter alia] final agency policy or determinations ... ." Id. Note that "DD5" is the
bygone NYPD designation-though it is still used, informally, by NYPD personnel--of
the form known as a Complaint Follow-Up Report ("DD" stood for Detective Division;
"5" was simply a sequential reference number). It is the primary document upon which
detectives record the progress of police investigations-such as the gathering of
information and evidence, the identity and statements of witnesses, and the results of
surveillance operations and canvasses. As such, it is often a rich source of information as
to a given police investigation, and generally a document of great interest to criminal
defense counsel, for obvious reasons.
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memo books 89 were the private property of the officers, thus placing
them outside of the ambit of FOIL, which only applies to agency records.
Pursuant to Scott, the NYPD's DD5s, as well as police officers' memo
books, were thus granted "blanket protection" from access under FOIL. 90
Scott remained the law of the land until 1996, when the New York
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Gould.91 As in Scott, the Gould
petitioners requested from the NYPD, and were denied access to, DD5s
and memo book entries. The agency's denial, which directly referenced
the Scott decision, was upheld in Supreme Court, and by the First
Department on appeal. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
Appellate Division and held that DD5s were not categorically exempt
from disclosure pursuant to N.Y. Public Officers Law section
87(2)(g)(iii) (hereinafter, the "Intra-Agency Materials Exemption" 92),
and that memo books were indeed agency-not private-property, and
were thus within the ambit of FOIL.93 As the Court observed, "blanket
exemptions ... for particular types of documents are inimical to FOIL's
policy of open government."
94
In addition to its holding, the Court, in dicta,95 also dispelled the
notion that Criminal Procedure Law Article 24096 is a statute that
explicitly exempts records from disclosure within the meaning of FOIL's
Statutory Exemption.97 In this regard, the Court cited Farbman v. NYC
89. A memo book consists of a bound pad, and is generally used to record a police
officer's day-to-day on-duty activity.
90. The court also found that memo books would nevertheless qualify for
exemption from disclosure under N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAw § 87(2)(b), as well as § 87(2)(g).
See Scott, 179 A.D.2d at 444, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 88.
93. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 278, 675 N.E.2d at 813.
94. Id. at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
95. See id. at 274, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
96. See supra note 11.
97. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 274, 675 N.E.2d at 811. The Court stated, "insofar as
the Criminal Procedure Law does not specifically preclude defendants from seeking ...
documents under FOIL, we cannot read such a categorical limitation into the statute," id.
(emphasis added), and cited N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(a), which only exempts from
disclosure records that "are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal
statute" (emphasis added). Thus, here the Court said only that, absent language in the
Criminal Procedure Law which specifically provides for exemption of a record, then the
Criminal Procedure Law did not fall within this particular exemption. See Gould, 89
N.Y.2d at 274, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
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Health & Hospitals Corp.,98 which had similarly held that CPLR Article
31 (the civil discovery statute) 99 did not fall within FOIL's Statutory
Exemption either. Although Gould's actual holding'00 and its dicta were
limited in scope, and the records at issue pertained to post-conviction
petitioners, Gould has sometimes been construed as opening the door to
using FOIL as a wholesale criminal discovery tool,'0 ' the reach of which
vitiates the Criminal Procedure Law.102
For instance, shortly after the Gould decision, an article in the New
York Criminal Law News declared that "[t]he immediate result of this
decision is a new discovery tool for defendants in criminal
proceedings."'1 3 Subsequently, one FOIL petitioner in an Article 78
proceeding proffered the proposition that Gould "clearly entitles criminal
defendants to use FOIL"R  4 in an attempt to construe the Court's dicta as
a de facto defeat of the respondent's defense under the Interference
Exempiono1 ---an entirely separate exemption based upon an entirely
different premise than that implicated in the dicta. Additionally, a recent
FOIL decision stated that "[tihe Court of Appeals has recently advanced
[in Gould] the proposition that inmates have rights under FOIL even
more expansive than the rights conferred to them by the Criminal
98. Farbman & Sons v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75,
81, 464 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1984). In Farbman, the Court held that absent an express
provision or unequivocal legislative intent so indicating, "CPLR Article 31 is not a statute
'specifically exempting' public records from disclosure under FOIL." Id. (citations
omitted).
99. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101, etseq.
100. The Court also decided a secondary issue: it rejected the claim of petitioner
Harold Scott, who had challenged the police department's certification that it could not
locate the records he had requested. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78 (Scott's
claim and FOIL's certification requirement).
101. Judge Bellacossa, in a prescient dissent, predicted that criminal defendants
would attempt to use FOIL in this manner. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 279-80, 675 N.E.2d
at 814-15 (Bellacossa, J., dissenting).
102. See supra Part I.
103. See Joseph DeFelice, A New Discovery Tool-The Freedom of Information
Act, 18 N.Y. CRmI. L. NExvs 1 (1996). Note that the author, attorney Joseph DeFelice,
was one of the Gould petitioners (though acting on behalf of a client). See Gould, 89
N.Y.2d at 273, 675 N.E.2d at 810. That article's position on the impact of the decision
is, thus, not altogether surprising.
104. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22,
1998, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (Petitioner's Affirmation, dated Aug. 6, 1997 titled a "Cross-
motion for Class Certification") (emphasis added).
105. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(i) (McKinney 1999).
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Procedure Law" (however, based upon the remainder of the court's
analysis, it does not appear that this interpretation materially affected the
outcome of that case).
106
Although such misconstruals (however irksome they may be to the
government attorney) are generally manageable, at times they can be
dangerous,10 7 as demonstrated in another decision rendered pursuant to a
proceeding brought by counsel for a criminal defendant awaiting trial.
There, the court entirely rejected the respondent's Interference
Exemption defense, simply stating that "[t]he Court in Gould stated that
factual information ... is 'available pursuant to the provisions of FOIL"'
and thus, incredibly, ordered the disclosure of the names and addresses
of witnesses in a drug-related contract-murder case.108 Additionally, in
what is the most troubling misinterpretation of Gould to date, in 1998, a
decision was rendered which announced that "it is proper, as per Gould,
for criminal defendants to use F.O.I.L. requests as a means of [criminal]
disclosure" and went on to use that conclusion as a springboard for
declaring that responses to such FOIL requests must therefore be made in
sufficient time "so that such disclosure can be used in preparation for
trial."' 0 9 This astonishing decision also specified that non-disclosure--or
even redaction--of a requested document required, prior to any litigation
106. Hillard v. Clark, 174 Misc.2d 282, 664 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1997), affd
254 A.D.2d 756, 677 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1998), leave denied, 92 N.Y.2d 818, 708 N.E.2d
177 (1997).
107. The Court in Gould acknowledged the potential dangers-including those to
the safety of witnesses-of the inappropriate disclosure of police files, leaving it to the
balance struck by FOIL's exemptions to ensure a check on the inherent risks carried by
such disclosure. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 278, 675 N.E.2d at 813.
108. See Codelia v. Police Dep't, No. 104987/97, Decision (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
June 11, 1997); Codelia v. Police Dep't, No. 104987/97, Decision on Reargument (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County October 21, 1997). This decision was subsequently-and extensively-
modified, upon reargument. Note that, the judge in the criminal case had already ruled,
prior to the FOIL proceeding, that such records were not available pursuant to criminal
discovery.
109. Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at
29 (Sup. Ct. 1998), but see Pittari v. Pirro, 179 Misc.2d 241, 683 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct.
1998), affd 258 A.D.2d 202, 696 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2d Dep't 1999) (records relating to a
pending prosecution are exempt from disclosure under FOIL, as their release constitutes
an interference with a judicial proceeding); accord Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City
Police Dep't, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 2000), appeal denied, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 3925
(N.Y. Dec. 21, 2000). See also Lecker v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 157 A.D.2d 486,
549 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dep't 1990), appeal dismissed, 75 N.Y.2d 946, 554 N.E.2d 1280
(1990) (the time within which a determination as to a FOIL request will be rendered is
left to the agency, and may not be proscribed).
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having been commenced, "a detailed fact-specific reason for that non-
disclosure."'
10
Of course many, if not most of these misinterpretations are doubtless
based upon an honest lack of understanding of FOIL and a less-than-
careful reading of Gould. Contrary to such misinterpretations, however,
the Court of Appeals, in Gould, specifically stated: "The holding herein
is only that these [complaint follow-up, or DD5] reports are not
categorically exempt as intra-agency material."' Thus, the Court was
extremely clear that Gould's holding was strictly limited to the narrow
issue concerning the application of the Intra-Agency Materials
Exemption to DD5's. Moreover, the Court also left no doubt as to the
limited scope of its Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 discussion-
which was, in any event, no more than dicta ll 2-as demonstrated by the
remainder of its holding, which specified that the records at issue could
in fact be withheld under, inter alia, the Law Enforcement Exemption:
"Indeed, the Police Department is entitled to withhold complaint follow-
up reports, or specific portions thereof, under any other applicable
exemption, such as the law-enforcement exemption ... ,"" Significantly,
the Court then remitted the matter to Supreme Court, to determine
"whether the Police Department can make a particularized showing that
any [other] claimed exemption applies;"' 1 4 something which it would not
110. Id. But see Capital Newspapers v. Bums, 67 N.Y.2d 562, 566, 496 N.E.2d
665, 667, 505 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1986) (an agency's burden of proof under FOIL only arises
during litigation).
111. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 277, 675 N.E.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
112. "A case... is precedent only as to those questions presented, considered and
squarely decided." People v. Bourne, 139 A.D.2d 210, 216, 531 N.Y.S.2d 899, 902-03
(Ist Dep't 1988) (citing Empire Sq. Realty v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 181 Misc. 752, 755 43
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943), affd 267 A.D. 817, 47 N.Y.S.2d 105, (1st Dep't
1944), leave denied 267 A.D. 901, 48 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st Dep't 1944)). But neither
FOL's Statutory Exemption nor, therefore, Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 had
been raised or argued in Gould because the records sought by the Gould petitioners all
related to completed criminal prosecutions that had resulted in convictions. The Court's
discussion here was, therefore, merely dicta, though Court of Appeals dicta carries
considerable weight in providing guidance to lower courts. See id. (citing Gimbel Bros. v.
White, 256 A.D. 439, 10 N.Y.S.2d 666 (3d Dep't 1939)). The guidance provided by this
dicta, however, has indeed been heeded: after Gould, few agencies, if any, would attempt
to argue that pre-prosecution records of this type are exempt based on Article 240 under
the Statutory Exemption. That, however, is the extent of the Court's guidance on this
issue, and none of FOIL's other exemptions fall within its scope. See supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
113. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 277, 675 N.E.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
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have done unless the records at issue were indeed possibly subject to
other exemptions, 15 such as the Law Enforcement Exemption as
suggested in the holding." 6 Thus, despite its frequent portrayal as having
opened a "back door" to criminal discovery in New York, 7 Gould has
actually left FOIL's most potent defense against such an incursion intact,
in the form of the Interference Exemption."
8
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Independent Nature of FOIL ' Exemptions
One reason that the Gould decision seems to have lent itself to such
misinterpretation may have less to do with the decision itself, and more
to do with the nature of the exemptions enumerated under FOIL.
Therefore, before delving into our analysis of FOIL's Interference
Exemption and the evidentiary burden required to sustain it, a simple
clarification as to the nature of FOIL's exemptions should prove useful.
Simply put, FOIL's exemptions are independent-that is, any record
may be subject to more than one exemption, and a court's finding that a
given exemption does not apply to a given record has no bearing upon
the potential applicability of any other exemptions to that record." 9
Gould's holding and remittal made this quite clear.120 However, based
upon FOIL's burden of proof,12 ' even if an exemption is perfectlyappropriate to a particular record, if that exemption is not raised-and
therefore not considered by the court-disclosure of the record may
115. Accord Short v. Board of Managers, 57 N.Y.2d 399, 404, 442 N.E.2d 1235,
1237 (1982) (FOIL's "exceptions to disclosure ... are independent").
116. As the Appellate Division, First Department, recently observed, "[w]hile
holding that these [DD5] reports were not categorically exempt as intra-agency materials,
the Court of Appeals in Gould clearly expressed reservations about their being released
too freely.." Johnson v. New York Police Dep't, 257 A.D.2d 343, 694 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st
Dep't 1999) (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., DeFelice, supra note 103.
118. The applicability of the Interference Exemption under FOIL is addressed in
detail infra Part IV.C.
119. See Short, 57 N.Y.2d at 404,442 N.E.2d at 1237 (1982) (FOIL's "exceptions
to disclosure... are independent").
120. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 277, 675 N.E.2d at 812.
121. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(4)(b).
[Vol. 44
GOULD DEBUNKED
nevertheless result (unless the court finds it appropriate to remit the
matter for further proceedings, as the Court of Appeals did in Gould).'22
Thus, in cases where the agency, for one reason or another, fails to
argue the "correct" exemption, judicial decisions can result which may
be misread as holding that a particular type of record is per se non-
exempt under FOIL, even though that non-availability is actually limited
to the facts of that case and the exemption argued. 123 An illustration of
this dynamic can be seen in the interplay between Scott v. Chief Medical
Examiner 24 and Laureano v Grimes.125 Approximately two weeks after
the First Department, in Scott, held that police officers' memo books
were the personal property of the officers, and were exempt under
FOIL's Personal Privacy 26 and Intra-Agency Materials exemptions, a
different panel of the First Department, in Laureano (also a FOIL
proceeding), ordered memo books disclosed. While this "apparent"
inconsistency may lead some to conclude that Laureano had overturned
Scott and found memo books to be per se accessible under FOIL, a
proper reading of the two decisions reveals that the Laureano court had
only construed the Law Enforcement Exemption's confidentiality
provision' 27 since, apparently, no other exemption had been raised in the
proceeding (note that the Scott decision had not yet been rendered when
Laureano was briefed and argued). Thus, the blanket protection afforded
by Scott was simply not affected by Laureano, as the First Department
itself confirmed in Johnson v. New York City Police Department,128 a
case decided subsequent to Laureano. There, the court stated, "[w]e
affirm our holding in Matter of Scott v. Chief Med. Examiner of the City
122. As previously set forth, there is actually no requirement to specify applicable
exemptions prior to litigation. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The
discussion here is only as to the failure to raise the appropriate-or the "correct"--
exemption during litigation, where the court did not remit the matter to the agency to
raise an additional exemption.
123. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22,
1998, at 29 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (where the court declared that Gould allows criminal
defendants to use FOIL for discovery purposes); see also supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
124. 179 A.D.2d 443, 577 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1st Dep't 1992).
125. 179 A.D.2d 602, 579 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st Dep't 1992).
126. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(b).
127. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(iii).
128. 220 A.D.2d 320, 632 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1995).
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of N.Y [citations omitted] that DD5 reports and police officers' memo
books are exempt from FOIL disclosure."
1 29
It is thus easy to see how a failure to fully comprehend the
independent nature of FOIL's exemptions, coupled with a less than
careful reading of Gould, can lead to erroneous conclusions. However,
just as "blanket exemptions ... are inimical to" the policies underlying
FOIL, so too is "blanket access." Thus, Gould's discussion as to the
inapplicability of FOIL's Statutory Exemption to Criminal Procedure
Law Article 240, simply cannot be read as having any effect on the
applicability of the Interference Exemption to a proceeding governed by
that article's discovery provisions.
B. FOIL's Federal.Analogue: The Freedom of Information Act
1. FOIA's Applicability to FOIL: The Parallel Statutes Doctrine
Not only is federal case law construing FOIA relevant to any
analysis of FOIL, but, in fact, no comprehensive analysis of FOIL can
effectively be undertaken without it, as FOIA and FOIL are parallel
statutes. The parallel relationship between FOIA and FOIL is undisputed.
In his Fordham Law Review article entitled The New York Freedom of
Infornation Law,1 30 New York State Senator Ralph Marino, one of
FOIL's sponsors, noted at the outset that FOIL was "[p]atterned after the
Federal Freedom of Information Act.'' 131 Additionally, in 1977, the New
York State Legislature amended FOIL 132 so as to more closely "conform
New York State's version ... to the Federal Law"133 which had itself
been amended only three years before.134 Therefore, the importance of
the relationship between FOIL and FOIA cannot be overstated, since that
relationship places FOIA's legislative history and interpretive precedents
central to the effective interpretation of the parallel provisions of FOIL.
The "doctrine" of construing a state statute by looking to the
construction of a parallel enactment is not new, and has had a long legal
129. Id. This language also dispels any notion that Scott had been limited to the
particular set of DD5s before the court at the time.
130. 43 FORDHAML. Rnv. 83 (1974).
131. Id. at 83.
132. See L. 1977, ch. 933 (effective January 1, 1978).
133. New York Legis. Ann., 1977, 330, 331.
134. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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tradition in New York as a basic canon of construction.135 In fact,
uniformity of construction between similar federal and state statutes has
long been held to be highly desirable and entitles relevant federal
decisions to great weight in determining an open question.136 indeed,
where the New York State Legislature models a statute after a federal
analogue, there is a specific presumption that the Legislature deliberately
and intentionally adopted the fundamental concepts underlying the
federal version.
137
Thus, "[wihere state statutes are identical or nearly identical in
language and purpose with federal statutes, New York courts generally
accord great weight to federal decisions construing such federal
statutes.... It has even been held that where the New York Court of
Appeals in construing a state statute followed federal decisions
interpreting a similar federal statute, a lower court was therefore bound
to follow the applicable federal cases in the field.' 138 Therefore, "[s]tate
legislation which is modeled after a Federal statute will be construed in
accordance with Federal decisions."'
139
The applicability of this doctrine to FOIA and FOIL is nowhere
clearer than in Fink v. Lefkowitz, 140 wherein the Court of Appeals, in
construing one of the four provisions of FOIL's Law Enforcement
Exemption, specified that:
[t]he legislative history of the Freedom of Information Law
indicates that many of its provisions, including the exemption at
issue here, were patterned after the Federal analogue.
Accordingly, Federal case law and legislative history on the
scope of this exemption are instructive.'4
135. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. § 262(b) (McKinney 1999) (statutes adopted from other
jurisdictions).
136. See Mosbacher v. Graves, 254 A.D. 438,5 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't 1938).
137. See Marx v. Bragalini, 6 N.Y.2d 322, 328, 160 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1959).
138. 28 N.Y. JuR. 2d, § 231,287,288 (emphasis added).
139. Comae v. American Distilling Co., 182 Misc. 926, 932,49 N.Y.S.2d 838, 844
(Sup. Ct. 1944) (citations omitted).
140. 47 N.Y.2d 567, 393 N.E.2d 463 (1979).
141. Id. at 572, 393 N.E.2d at 466 (citations omitted); see also Westchester News
v. Kimball, 50 N.Y.2d 575, 408 N.E.2d 904 (1980); Washington Post Co. v. New York
State Ins. Dep't, 61 N.Y.2d 557, 567, 463 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1984); Hanig v. New York
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 588 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1992); Hawkins v.
Kurlander, 98 A.D.2d 14, 16-17, 469 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (4th Dep't 1983); McAuley v.
Board of Educ., 61 A.D.2d 1048, 1048-49, 403 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (2d Dep't 1978).
20001
NEW YORKLAWSCHOOL LAWREVIEW
Thus, in Hawkins v. Kurlander142 the Appellate Division, also
recognizing that the Law Enforcement Exemption (in particular, the very
provision of the Law Enforcement Exemption we are concerned with
here-the Interference Exemption 43) is one which was specifically
patterned after a parallel FOIA provision, adopted the construction of
federal case law regarding the FOIA version of the exemption.
144
Moreover, not only is FOIL's legislative history clear that FOIL was
patterned after FOIA, 145 but FOIA's own voluminous legislative
history146 provides a fount of guidance as to legislative intent. This is
especially true of FOIA's Interference Exemption, the 1974 amendment
of which was in response to specific, and well-documented,
Congressional concerns.147 Moreover, it is significant that FOIL itself
was amended to substantially its present form in 1977, in order to more
closely "conform [it]... to the Federal Law,"'148 subsequent to FOIA's
1974 amendment. Of even greater significance, FOIL's Interference
Exemption, one of the provisions revised upon FOIL's 1977 amendment,
followed the format of FOIA's Interference Exemption amendment in
virtual lockstep, with extraordinary similarity. 149 The connection between
the two statutes-and especially of their respective Interference
Exemptions-is therefore inescapable. Thus, any analysis of FOIL's
Interference Exemption must, for guidance, look to its FOIA
142. 98 A.D.2d 14,469 N.Y.S.2d 820(4th Dep't 1983).
143. The applicability of the Interference Exemption under FOIL is addressed in
detail infra Part IV.C.
144. See Hawkins, 98 A.D.2d at 16-17,469 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
145. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
146. FOIA's legislative history is addressed in detail infra Part IV.B.2.b.ii.
147. See id.
148. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
149. Prior to its 1977 amendment, FOIL had provided, in pertinent part, that
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of this section [providing for access
to agency records], this article shall not apply to information that is ... d. part of
investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 88,
subd. 7, d; see L. 1974, ch 578; L 1974, ch 579. Upon its amendment, the relevant
provision required that "[e]ach agency shall ... make available for public inspection and
copying all records, except ... records or portions thereof that ... (e) are compiled for
law enforcement purposes and which, if disclosed, would [inter alia] interfere with law
enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings." N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(i).
Compare FOIA's amendment of "Exemption 7," discussed infra Part IV.B.2.a. Note the
extraordinary similarity between thepre-amendment versions of these provisions, as well.
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counterpart, 150 the legislative intent, and the construction of which must
be deemed to have been adopted by the New York Legislature.1
51
2. Interference with a Proceeding
a. The 1974 Amendment to FOIA
Originally, FOIA's Exemption 7 had protected from disclosure
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a private party."'152 The exemption's purpose in
precluding the use of FOIA as a discovery tool had historically been
recognized by the courts. 53 The exemption's amendment in 1974154 was
in specific response to four decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit,
rendered in 1973 and 1974.15' These four decisions barred access to
investigatory files, not simply where an enforcement proceeding was
imminent or in contemplation, but even where no such proceeding was
contemplated, or where the proceeding had been completed, and
regardless of the actual nature of the material contained in such a file.
156
This "blanket protection" from disclosure which was thus afforded by the
construction rendered by these decisions 157 had, in the eyes of Congress,
completely exceeded the exemption's original purpose, 158 and "shield[ed]
from disclosure information that Congress had not intended to
150. See Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d at 572, 393 N.E.2d at 466.
151. Cf. id.; see also Marx v. Bragalini, 6 N.Y.2d 322, 328, 160 N.E.2d 611, 613;
Mosbacher v. Graves, 254 A.D. 438,5 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't 1938).
152. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
153. See, e.g., Wellman Industries Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974);
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971); Williams v. IRS, 345 F.Supp. 591,
594 (D. Del. 1972); Clement Bros., Inc. v. NLRB, 282 F.Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978) (citations omitted) ("[T]he
1966 Act was expressly intended to protect against the mandatory disclosure through
FOIA of witnesses' statements prior to an unfair labor practice proceeding. From one of
the first reported decisions under FOLA, through the time of the 1974 amendments, the
courts uniformly recognized this purpose.").
154. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
155. See Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 30 (1973);
Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (1974); Center for Nat'l. Policy Review on Race and
Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (1974).
156. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 228-29.
157. Id. at 236.
158. Seeid. at227.
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protect., 159 In the words of Senator Philip A. Hart, the amendment's
proponent, these decisions thereby "erected a 'stone wall' against public
access to any material in an investigatory file., 160 Thus, pursuant to the
1974 amendment, the application of Exemption 7 became limited to:
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D)
disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a
lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source, (E)
disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger
the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel .... 161
b. Construction of the 1974 Amendment's Interference
Exemption
i. Foundation: Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB
162
In 1976, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
the case of Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB 163 directly construing FOIA's
Interference Exemption (known in the case law as "Exemption 7(A)")
1'
in light of the legislative history surrounding the 1974 amendment. In
Title Guarantee, the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB" or the
"Board") was before the court on its appeal from a district court order
which had required disclosure of investigative statements obtained by the
Board from employees of the Title Guarantee Company pursuant to an
unfair labor practice charge. That order had stemmed from the
159. Id.
160. Id. at 229 (emphasis added). Note also that the word "file" was changed to
"record," specifically to prevent the blanket protection afforded by commingling material
in an investigatory file which did not have to be kept confidential. Id. at 229-30.
161. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
162. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
163. Id.
164. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1994).
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company's FOIA request to the NLRB seeking disclosure of the
statements prior to the Board's hearing on the charge. When the Board
denied the request (claiming exemption under FOIA), both initially and
on administrative appeal, 165 Title Guarantee filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 166 The district court
rejected the Board's Exemption 7(A) argument that disclosure prior to
the hearing would interfere with the proceeding. 167 The court concluded
that release of the records "would not block further information of the
same type from similar sources nor would it stifle effective preparation
of the case" and that "it does not appear that the specific enforcement
proceeding would be harmed."'168 The order of disclosure was followed
by the Board's appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a review of the NLRB's
rules for the conduct of its proceedings, focusing on its rules governing
discovery, "[s]ince the substantive effect of acceptance of [Title
Guarantee's] disclosure contentions would be tantamount to the issuance
of new, broader discovery rules for NLRB proceedings., 169 The court
noted that the NLRB's rules permitted only limited discovery in its
proceedings, which did not extend to pre-hearing disclosure of the
statements sought by Title Guarantee. In other words the NLRB's
discovery scheme had apparently been designed to preclude access to
witness statements prior to a hearing.
In considering the alteration of the NLRB's discovery scheme, which
would result from allowing pre-hearing access to the materials sought,
and upon examination of FOIA's case law and the legislative history of
its 1974 amendment, the court concluded: "We cannot envisage that
Congress intended to overrule the line of cases dealing with ...
discovery in pending enforcement proceedings by virtue of a back-door
amendment to the FOIA when it could very easily have done so by direct
amendment .... 170 In this regard, the court found it "significant that it is
never suggested in the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to the
FOIA that any ... modification of agency discovery rules was
intended,"'171 and noted that "[t]he cases that Exemption 7(A) was
165. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. See id.
167 See id. at 503-04.
168. Id. at 505.
169. Title Guarantee, 534 F.2d at 487.
170. Id. at 491.
171. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
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intended to overrule were for the most part closed investigatory file
cases."
172
The Circuit court concluded, contrary to the district court's
finding,173 that "interference with the proceedings could well result' 74
from the pre-hearing disclosure of materials not otherwise available
under the Board's discovery scheme, based upon at least two avenues
that the Board suggested: "first, suspected violators might use disclosure
to learn the Board's case in advance and frustrate the proceedings or
construct defenses which would permit violations to go unremedied;
[and] second, employees who are interviewed may be reluctant ... to
have it known that they have given information .... 1 75 In direct support
of the first of these two propositions, the court quoted from the 1974
amendment's legislative history,' 76 which stated in pertinent part: "One
example of interference when litigation is pending or in prospect is harm
to the Government's case through the premature release of information
not possessed by known or potential adverse parties [citations omitted]."
Thus, the court held that the statements sought by Title Guarantee, prior
to the Board's hearing, were indeed exempt from disclosure under
Exemption 7(A).
177
ii. The Standard: NLRB v. Robbins Tire
178
A number of circuits followed the Second Circuit's lead in the Title
Guarantee decision, 179 thus establishing "the weight of Circuit authority"
as to the construction of Exemption 7(A).180 However, in 1977, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in deciding another
labor relations case, Robbins Tire and Rubber Co. v. NLRB,18' rejected
172. Id.
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
174. Title Guarantee, 534 F.2d at 491.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 492 (quoting from the Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974
Amendments, as documented in the FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS
OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS AND OTMER
DOCUMENTS 508, 517-17 (1975)).
177. See Title Guarantee, 534 F.2d at 492.
178. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
179. See id. at 219 n.5 (enumerating the decisions that followed Title Guarantee).
180. Id.
181. 563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the Second Circuit's view of "'earlier or greater access' as a kind of
interference protected against by exemption 7(A)."' 82 Despite the fact
that the Fifth Circuit indeed found that "[i]n the present situation, there
may be some risk of interference with Board proceedings in the form of
witness intimidation from harassment of an employee-witness ... in an
effort to silence him or dilute the nature of his testimony,"'183 it
nevertheless held that the Board had failed to sustain "its burden of
proving that the possibility of intimidation in this case through disclosure
... brings Exemption 7(A) into play.' ' 184 This holding essentially
affirmed that of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, which had held that without a "claim that release of the
documents ... would pose [a] unique or unusual danger of interference
with the particular enforcement proceeding, Exemption 7(A) did not
apply.' ' i85 After finding, additionally, that the Board had failed to sustain
its burden as to the other exemptions raised, the Circuit court affirmed
the district court's order compelling disclosure. 186 Upon the Board's
petition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve the conflict
among the Circuits.' 8 7
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether FOIA
required the NLRB to disclose, prior to a hearing on an unfair labor
practice complaint, statements of witnesses whom the Board intended to
call at the hearing. Resolution of the question turned, according to the
Court, on "whether production of the material prior to the hearing would
interfere with enforcement proceedings within the meaning of Exemption
7(A) of FOIA."' 88 At the outset, the Court soundly rejected the position
of the appellee, Robbins Tire & Rubber Company (and of both the
District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals), that
determinations of interference under Exemption 7(A) must be made on a
case-by-case basis.189 The Court found that the language of the
exemption, as a whole, in fact suggested the contrary. 90 As the Court
noted:
182. Id. at 730.
183. Id. at 732.
184. Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
185. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
186. See id. at219.
187. Id. at 220.
188. Id. at216.
189. Seeid. at223.
190. See id. at 223-24.
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There is a readily apparent difference between subdivision (A)
and subdivisions (B), (C), and (D). The latter subdivisions refer
-to particular cases- "a person," "an unwarranted invasion," "a
confidential source"-- and thus seem to require a showing that
the factors made relevant by the statute are present in each
distinct situation. By contrast, since subdivision (A) speaks in
the plural voice about 'enforcement proceedings,' it appears to
contenplate that certain generic determinations might be
made.
19I
The Court then proceeded to undertake a detailed review of FOIA's
legislative history, specifically focusing on Exemption 7's 1974
amendment. 9 2 Key to an understanding of Exemption 7(A), the Court
pointed out (as had the Title Guarantee court' 93) that one of the original,
pre-amendment purposes of Exemption 7194 "was to prevent 'harm [to]
the Government's case in court' by not allowing litigants 'earlier or
greater access' to agency investigatory files than they would otherwise
have."'195 The Court went on to note, with regard to the passage of the
amendment, that "[i]ndeed, in an unusual, post-passage reconsideration
vote, the Senate modified the language of this Exemption specifically to
meet Senator Humphrey's concern that it might be construed to require
disclosure of 'statements of agency witnesses' prior to the time they were
called on to testify in agency proceedings." 196 In this regard, the Court
noted, Senator Humphrey had been concerned that, in NLRB
proceedings in particular, "'[w]itnesses would be loath to give statements
if they knew that their statements were going to be made known to the
parties before the hearing'.' 97 Senator Humphrey subsequently agreed
that the version of the exemption ultimately passed in 1966 would "take
care of the situation" he had voiced such concerns about.'98 The Court
further observed that courts uniformly recognized the purpose of the
191. Id. (emphasis added). Note that FOIL's parallel provision is likevise stated in
the plural. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(i).
192. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 224.
193. See 534 F.2d at 490.
194. Prior to the inclusion of Exemption 7's interference provision. See supra Part
IV.B.2.a.
195. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 226.
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exemption, to preclude premature disclosure of witness statements,
through the time of the 1974 amendment.' 99
Turning its attention to the amendment itself, the Court noted that,
pursuant to his initial proposal of the amendment on the Senate floor,
Senator Hart had specifically referred to the original intent of the 1966
Congress "'to prevent harm to the Government's case by not allowing an
opposing litigant earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he
would otherwise have' ... [and] indicated his continued agreement with
this purpose."200 The Court observed that "Senator Hart believed that his
amendment would [both] rectify [the] erroneous judicial interpretations
[which had prompted the amendment] and clarify Congress' original
intent,"20 1 and that "[t]he thrust of congressional concern in its
amendment of Exemption 7 was [simply] to make clear that the
Exemption did not endlessly protect material simply because it was in an
investigatory file. 20 2 Further emphasizing that the 1974 amendment was
not meant to alter the original pre-amendment intent of the exemption,
the Court explained:
That the 1974 Congress did not mean to undercut the intent of
the 1966 Congress with respect to Senator Humphrey's concern
about interference with pending NLRB enforcement proceedings
is apparent from the emphasis that both Senators Kennedy and
Hart, the leaders in the debate on Exemption 7, placed on the fact
that the amendment represented no radical departure from prior
case law.203
It is thus clear that the purpose of the amendment was not to
effectuate any change as to the exemption's scope or to overturn the case
law construing what constitutes an interference, which had always
encompassed "earlier or greater access" to agency files than otherwise
available under the operative discovery scheme in a potential proceeding.
In construing the evidentiary burden required to sustain the
exemption, the Court also considered then-President Ford's veto message
in response to the 1974 amendment, as well as the debate which led to
Congress's override of the veto. The Court found it significant that
199. See id.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 230.
203. Id. at 232.
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President Ford's expressed view that the amended version of the
exemption "would require the Government to 'prove... -separately for
each paragraph of each document-that disclosure 'would' cause' a
specific harm," was emphatically rejected by the leading supporters of
the amendment who, referring to that construction as "ludicrous," stated
that "the burden is substantially less than we would be led to believe by
the President's message." 2 4 Upon completion of its foray into
Exemption 7's legislative history, the Court concluded that:
[W]hile the [Fifth Circuit] Court of Appeals was correct that the
amendment of Exemption 7 was designed to eliminate "blanket
exemptions" for Government records simply because they were
found in investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes, we think it erred in concluding that no generic
determinations of likely interference can ever be made. We
conclude that Congress did not intend to prevent the federal
courts from determining that, with respect to particular kinds of
enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of
investigatory records while a case is pending would generally
"interfere with enforcement proceedings."20 5
Upon arriving at this foundational conclusion 206 the Court then held
that "witness statements in pending unfair labor practice proceedings are
exempt from FOIA disclosure at least until completion of the Board's
hearing.20 7 The Court reasoned that "[h]istorically, the NLRB has
provided little pre-hearing discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings
and has relied principally on statements such as those sought here to
prove its case.... A profound alteration in the Board's trial strategy...
would thus be effectuated' if a case-by-case showing of interference
were required as to each individual proceeding, such as had been held by
the Fifth Circuit.20 8 In this regard the Court, consistent with basic tenets
of statutory interpretation, also noted that:
In the absence of clear congressional direction to the contrary,
we should be hesitant under ordinary circumstances to interpret
204. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at236 (emphasis added).
206. Based upon this conclusion, the "generic category" approach and the policy
(held by both Congress and the New York Court of Appeals) against "blanket
exemptions" are, clearly, perfectly consistent.
207. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236.
208. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
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an ambiguous statute to create such dislocations. Not only is
such direction lacking, but Congress in 1966 was particularly
concerned that premature production of witnesses' statements in
NLRB proceedings would adversely affect that agency's ability
to prosecute violations of the [National Labor Relations Act],
and, as indicated above, the legislative history of the 1974
amendments affords no basis for concluding that Congress at
that time intended to create any radical departure from prior,
court-approved, Board practice. Our reluctance to override a
long tradition of agency discovery, based on nothing more than
an amendment to a statute designed to deal with a wholly
different problem, is strengthened by our conclusion that the
dangers posed by premature release of the statements sought
here would involve precisely the kind of "interference with
enforcement proceedings" that Exemption 7(A) was designed to
avoid.20 9
The Court then considered the specific types-that is, the generic
categories-of interference which could result from pre-hearing
disclosure. The Court found "the most obvious risk of 'interference'
with enforcement proceedings in this context" to be coercion or
intimidation of those who have given statements "in an effort to make
them change their testimony or not testify at all." 210 Although the Court
found this risk to be especially acute as applied to an employee-employer
context, the Court also recognized that "both employees and non-
employees [in other words, any witnesses] may be reluctant to give
statements ... at all, absent assurance that unless called to testify in a
hearing, their statements will be exempt from disclosure" until after the
adjudication. 211  Finally, addressing what is perhaps its most
comprehensive category of interference posed by pre-hearing disclosure,
the Court reiterated that which had always been among Congress's
primary concerns in enacting and amending the exemption:
disclosure ... would constitute an 'interference' with ...
enforcement proceedings [if] a party litigant [receives] earlier
and greater access to the [government's] case than he would
209. Id. at 238-39; accord N.Y. STAT. § 153 (McKinney 1971) (a change in long
established rule of law is not deemed to have been intended by the Legislature in the
absence of a clear manifestation of such intention).
210. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 239.
211. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
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otherwise have .... Even without intimidation or harassment a
suspected violator with advance access to the Board's case could
'construct defenses which would permit violations to go
unremedied', z2
The Court found that this possibility arose simply based upon the
disclosure itself. 213 Also noting that it could not see how FOIA's purpose
(which, like that of New York's FOIL, is to ensure an informed
citizenry),214 "would be defeated by deferring disclosure until after the
Government has 'presented its case in court"' and that Congress "could
not have intended [FOIA's amendment] to overturn the NLRB's long-
standing rule against pre-hearing disclosure,"2 5 the Court reversed the
judgement of the Fifth Circuit, concluding:
It was Congress' understanding, and it is our conclusion, that
release of such statements necessarily 'would interfere' in the
statutory sense with the Board's 'enforcement proceedings.' We
therefore conclude that the [Fifth Circuit] Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the Board was not entitled to withhold such
statements under Exemption 7(A).216
In a concurring opinion which echoed the Court's recognition of
"earlier and greater" access as a category of interference, 217 Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, added:
The "act of meddling in" a process is one of Webster's accepted
definitions of the word "interference". A statute that authorized
discovery greater than that available under the rules normally
applicable to an enforcement proceeding would "interfere" with
the proceeding in that sense. The court quite correctly holds that
the Freedom of Information Act does not authorize any such
212. Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
213. See id. at 242-43. Compare Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 572-73, 393
N.E.2d 463, 466-467 (1979) ("However beneficial its thrust, the purpose of the Freedom
of Information Law is not to enable persons to use agency records ... to construct a
defense to impede a prosecution.... The Freedom of Information Law was not enacted
to furnish the safecracker with the combination to the safe.').
214. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 242; see also N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 84.
215. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 242.
216. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 241.
[Vol. 44
GOULD DEBUNKED
interference in Labor Board enforcement proceedings. Its
rationale applies equally to any enforcement proceeding.218
Thus, in construing the burden required to sustain a denial of
disclosure pursuant to FOIA's Interference Exemption, the Supreme
Court in Robbins Tire rejected the proposition that a case-by-case
examination of records was required, and instead found that "generic
determinations" (in the context of both records and harm) were implicitly
authorized by the language of the exemption. Moreover, in reciting
several categories of obvious risk of harm posed by pre-hearing
disclosure of records not otherwise available pursuant to an agency's
discovery scheme, the court's most encompassing finding in that regard
was as to the risk posed by "earlier or greater access"219 than that
authorized by a discovery scheme.220 This finding was well supported by
legislative history, and was further emphasized in the concurring
opinion. That concurrence also emphasized the likewise obvious
application of the Court's rationale to any enforcement proceeding, in an
observation which was not lost upon future courts.
iii. Clarification: J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Perry
221
In a FOIA case commenced in 1976, but not decided until after the
Supreme Court rendered its Robbins Tire decision, the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 22  (the "EEOC" or the
"Commission") had filed an employment discrimination charge against
J.P. Stevens and Company, Incorporated ("Stevens"), prompting a FOIA
request by Stevens to the EEOC for several categories of documents.223
The EEOC granted access to some of the requested records, noted that
certain other records did not exist, and denied access to still others (the
denied documents were ultimately identified as affidavits and statements
of witnesses made to the EEOC pursuant to its investigation, certain
correspondence between the Commission and various parties, and certain
218. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added); accord U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776-77 (1989)
(citing Robbins Tire's concurring opinion, with approval).
219. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 241.
220. See id.
221. 710 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
222. Defendant Lowell Perry was then the Chairman of the Commission.
223. See J.P. Stevens, 710 F.2d at 137.
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internal memoranda).22 4 That denial was upheld on administrative appeal,
upon which Stevens filed suit in the U.S. District Court for South
Carolina. The EEOC defended against disclosure on the basis of FOIA
Exemptions 3225 and 7(A). However, after an in camera inspection of the
documents, the district court held that Exemption 3 did not apply and
that Exemption 7(A) only applied to the affidavits and statements of
witnesses, and ordered disclosure of the remaining withheld
documents.22 6 EEOC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
In its argument on appeal, the EEOC claimed that Exemption 7(A)
entitled the records at issue to a "blanket exemption" from disclosure,
simply because they had been compiled for law enforcement purposes.
The court summarily rejected this argument, noting Congress's rejection221
of the same proposition by its 1974 amendment of FOIA. However,
upon a review of the legislative history of the 1974 amendment and upon
extensive reference to Robbins Tire itself, the court noted that "[w]hile a
'blanket exemption,' as urged by the Commission, is not mandated by
Robbins Tire, neither is a case-by-case approach. 228 The district court,
however, had indeed proceeded on a case-by-case basis, reviewing each
document in camera even after the EEOC had made a showing of
interference based on sixteen document categories. 2 9 The circuit court
found that "[t]he examination of each document within the category by
the district court was error,' 230 as was its order that some of the
documents be disclosed,231 and reversed the district court as to that
portion of its decision addressing Exemption 7(A).232
The circuit court found that an examination of the "titles" of each of
the sixteen document categories (e.g., "internal memos between various
offices of the EEOC concerning the processing of the charges filed";
224. See id. at 138.
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994). Exemption 3 provides an exclusion from
disclosure for records which are specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute,
within certain parameters.
226. See J.P. Stevens, 710 F.2d at 138.
227. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
228. See J.P. Stevens, 710F.2d at 141.
229. See id. at 142.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 143.
232. However, the circuit court affirmed the district court's rejection of the
EEOC's Exemption 3 argument. See id.
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"[c]orrespondence between labor organizations and the Commission
concerning the processing of charges"; and a number of other categories
of internal memos and correspondence, as well as several categories
pertaining to the aforementioned affidavits and witness statements) was a
sufficient identification of the records at issue, pursuant to the Robbins
Tire standard, to support its holding "that disclosure ... would interfere
with any enforcement proceeding that may stem from the
investigation. 233 The court noted that "[t]hese categories [of records]
represent the 'generic determinations' of Robbins Tire. '234 Additionally,
the court enumerated four generic categories of interference that would
result from premature disclosure of the materials within the enumerated
record categories:
Premature disclosure of these documents would (1) create a
"chilling effect" on potential witnesses and dry up sources of
information ... ; (2) hamper the free flow of ideas between
Commission employees and supervisors or with other
governmental agencies; (3) hinder its ability to shape and control
investigations; and (4) make more difficult the future
investigation of charges and enforcement thereof.
235
Finally, the court observed that: "It is obvious that plaintiff brought
this action with the intention of using the freedom of information act as a
discovery tool. Robbins Tire makes clear that such premature discovery
was not intended and is the type of 'interference' prohibited by
exemption 7(A). 236
The J.P. Stevens decision is particularly salient due to its
clarification of Robbins Tire's application as well as its scope. Not only
had the district court erred in reviewing each requested document
individually, but its order had limited the applicability of Exemption
7(A) to witness statements and affidavits2 7 in an apparent, albeit
insufficient, attempt at conformity with Robbins Tire. In an effort to
shed light on the district court's error, the circuit court stated "[a]n
understanding of Robbins Tire is complicated by the language of the
majority which seems to restrict itself to statements of witnesses. 2 38 The




237. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
238. J.P. Stevens, 710 F.2d at 141.
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court, however, dispelled the notion of any such limitation by denying
disclosure as to all sixteen of categories of records, thereby reaching well
beyond witness statements and affidavits, based upon the aforementioned
categories of interference. In addition, the court, here reviewing a matter
beyond the context of a NLRB proceeding, further noted that "the scope
of Robbins Tire is clarified by a short concurrence of three justices,"
239
and quoted the concurring opinion of Justices Stevens, Burger and
Rehnquise 4° which specified that Robbins Tire's rationale applied
equally to "any enforcement proceeding.,
2 41
iv. The Landscape Since Robbins Tire
A number of decisions have applied the Supreme Court's Robbins
Tire standard. Both the spectrum and scope of the Robbins Tire
"categories" developed in some of these cases should certainly prove
instructive.242 A number of such cases involved records based on
criminal proceedings. For instance, FOIA actions brought by the targets
of several criminal tax investigations culminated in decisions that barred
access to the records, under Exemption 7(A), pursuant to the Robbins
Tire standard.
In Grabinski v Internal Revenue Service,243 a FOIA case stemming
from a pre-prosecution request for tax-related criminal investigatory
records, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied
disclosure pursuant to Exemption 7(A), finding that the documents,
which were
generally ... categorized as 1) information received from third
parties in the course of the IRS's investigation of plaintiff, 2)
letters to and from such third parties, 3) memoranda compiled by
the Special Agent of telephone conversations, and 4) the Special
Agent's worksheets, notes, diary entries, etc., [had been]
compiled by [the IRS] during the course of an investigation into
239. Id.
240. See also supra note 218 and accompanying text.
241. J.P. Stevens, 710 F.2d at 141. There is no indication, however, that there had
ever been any question as to Robbins Tire's scope, nor should there be; nothing in the
statute or its legislative history ever suggested that Exemption 7(A) was somehow limited
to NLRB cases.
242. See Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 572, 393 N.E.2d 463,466 (1979).
243. 478 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
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possible criminal... liability of plaintiff [and that the completed
investigation had been] referred to the United States
Attorneys.. . for possible criminal prosecution.244
Once again, "earlier or greater access" was cited as a category of
interference recognized under Robbins Tire.245 The court found that the
documents involved fell within the exemption, holding that the
"[p]laintiff may not utilize the FOIA to gain earlier or greater access to
agency information than a normal litigant."
246
The same result was reached in Barney v. IRS,247 a case involving
similar facts to those of Grabinski, as well as in Hatcher v. U.S. Postal
Service,248 Kacilauskas v. Department of Justice,249 and Peterzell v.
Department of Justice.250 All of these cases involved various categories
of records sought by the targets of enforcement proceedings, where
criminal prosecutions were in contemplation. Citing Robbins Tire, each
of these decisions held that disclosure was barred by Exemption 7(A),
either based on the interference caused by "earlier or greater access," or
based on several additional categories of interference such as the
possibility of intimidation of witnesses, destruction or alteration of
evidence, and fabrication of alibis.251 The categories of records in the
above examined cases range from witness statements (whether in
affidavits or in summary form), to all manner of correspondence, internal
memoranda, and other internal documents created by agency personnel
relating to the investigation, handwritten notes of investigators,
subpoenas, analyses, worksheets, diary entries, and so on.
In Steinberg v. Internal Revenue Service,252 another FOIA action
seeking disclosure of records relating to the IRS's criminal investigation
of the plaintiff, the court held the documents at issue to be protected
under Exemption 7(A), finding that they fell into the following broad
categories:
244. Id. at 487.
245. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
246. Grabinski, 478 F. Supp. at 488.
247. 618 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1980).
248. 556 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. 1982).
249. 565 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. I1. 1983).
250. 576 F. Supp. 1492 (D.C. 1983).
251. See id. at 1495 (citing these additional categories).
252. 463 F.Supp. 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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(1) internal IRS documents and memoranda regarding audits and
investigations; (2) handwritten notes regarding the conduct of the
investigations prepared by [the agents assigned to the
investigations]; (3) correspondence between the IRS and
prospective witnesses in the investigation; (4) grand jury
subpoenas and analysis of documents submitted to the grand
jury; and (5) correspondence between the IRS and other
governmental agencies concerning the conduct of the
investigations or containing information regarding targets and
witnesses of the investigations. 3
The court stated that it was "clear ... that premature disclosure of
these records could seriously hamper these ongoing investigations and
prejudice the government's prospective case against the plaintiff and
others. 2 54 The court recognized the oft-stated legislative concern that
"[f]oremost among the purposes of this exemption was to prevent 'harm
[to] the Government's case in court' . . by not allowing litigants 'earlier
or greater access' to agency investigatory files than they would otherwise
have (citations omitted)," and rejected the interpretation that Robbins
Tire was limited to NLRB proceedings. 5 The court noted that "[tihe
courts have consistently held that the FOIA was 'not intended as a
private discovery tool. 2 56 The court also pointed out that the restrictive
discovery rules applicable to NLRB proceedings had been analogized to
the limitations on criminal discovery, 257 and observed that it could not
conceive of any enforcement proceeding where there exists a greater
potential for harm than that which may arise from a criminal
proceeding.258 In this regard the court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Murdock,2 9 which had concluded that "the FOIA was
not intended as a device to ... enlarge the scope of discovery beyond
that already provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 260
253. Steinberg, 463 F.Supp. at 1273.
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 1274.
256. Id. (citations omitted).
257. See id.; see also infra Part IV.C (discussion regarding New York's criminal
discovery scheme, and interference with a judicial proceeding).
258. See Steinberg, 463 F.Supp. at 1273.
259. 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
260. Id. at 602.
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Steinberg's citation to Murdock raises an interesting aspect of
Exemption 7(A)'s application in the context of a criminal proceeding.
Murdock was decided by the Fifth Circuit prior to its original, ill-fated
Robbins Tire decision which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme
Court. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit's Robbins Tire decision did not
purport to conflict with Murdock, which the circuit court distinguished
because the Murdock decision involved a criminal proceeding. In that
regard, the circuit court specified that "the special dangers that discovery
[under FOIA] would pose to a criminal prosecution.., were so great that
Congress could not possibly have intended disclosure."261 Murdock had
in fact followed Title Guarantee262 in this regard263 and the Fifth
Circuit's divergence from the "weight of Circuit authority" on this
issue264 therefore never even extended to the realm of criminal
proceedings. Thus, in a certain sense, Steinberg's reference to Murdock
brings us full circle in the inquiry as to whether or not the FOIA may be
used as a discovery tool; although the Supreme Court has since answered
that question in the negative, the very circuit which initially brought that
question to the fore had apparently long before reached the identical
conclusion, to the extent that the question involved criminal discovery.
Robbins Tire and the subsequent cases construing Exemption 7(A)
address a wide range of records including, inter alia, witness statements,
all form of internal and external memoranda, correspondence, subpoenas,
analyses, worksheets, notes, and diary entries made by investigators
related to the investigations at issue. What is thus apparent from these
cases is that virtually any category of record which, by its description, is
legitimately attributable to a potential enforcement proceeding-and is
therefore reasonably subject to any discovery provisions which may
govern that proceeding-will be subject to exemption in that "earlier or
greater access" to such a record is a legitimate category of interference
and, in fact, was a category of specific Congressional concern, both upon
the FOIA's original enactment and upon its amendment.265 Obviously,
the records must be shown to relate to the proceeding or to the
261. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 731 n.19 (5th Cir 1977).
262. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
263. See Murdock, 548 F.2d at 602.
264. See also supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
265. Various categories of documents may well be exempt from disclosure
pursuant to various other categories of interference. However, it appears that "earlier or
greater access" is the category that will always apply where a proceeding is potentially in
prospect.
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underlying investigation. However, where a request itself indicates that
it seeks records relating to or created pursuant to the proceeding or the
underlying investigation, such a showing is satisfied by the very terms of
the request.
266
C. FOIL's Interference Exemption Under Robbins Tire
1. Criminal Proceedings in New York
As set forth earlier, Article 240 of New York's Criminal Procedure
Law governs, generally, the criminal discovery process. A detailed
treatment of all of its provisions is unnecessary here.267 Suffice it to say
that the process is a creature of statute, there being no common law
authority for a court to compel pre-trial criminal discovery.26s As such,
its parameters are a matter of state legislative policy,269 although certain
constitutional and fundamental fairness requirements have been found to
apply.270 Essentially, the statutory scheme established by the legislature
provides a detailed regimen governing the material to be made available
under discovery, as well as the time frames within which the material is
to be disclosed. "[Intems not enumerated in article 240 are not
discoverable as a matter of right unless constitutionally or otherwise
specially mandated."27' 1
Pursuant to the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Law section
240.20 specifies those items which must ordinarily be disclosed to the
defense, pre-trial. The scheme also provides for the availability of a
protective order, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 240.50,
"denying, limiting, conditioning, delaying or regulating discovery" for a
variety of reasons including "the risk of physical harm, intimidation,
economic reprisal, bribery or unjustified annoyance or embarrassment
." Moreover, the mere making of a motion for a protective order,
266. See e.g., Barney v. I.R.S., 618 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir 1980).
267. See Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.10
(McKinney 1993) for a general overview of the subject.
268. See id. at 216 (citing Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927)).
269. See id. (citing W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.1 (2d ed.
1992)).
270. See, e.g., PREISER, supra note 267.




which can be done by any affected person (e.g., a witness, a confidential
informant, or a law enforcement officer, in addition to prosecutors and
defendants themselves) is enough to suspend discovery.272 Thus, in
Article 240, the legislature has recognized the potential harm that
unfettered disclosure in the criminal litigation context may entail and has
established protective mechanisms (in the form of the article's time
frames, as well as its protective order provision) which provide a balance
between that harm and the policy of "the fair and effective administration
of justice '273 which Article 240 seeks to promote. As specifically set
forth in the Governor's Memorandum approving the enactment of Article
240 in 1979, the statute was "evenly balanced to avoid giving any undue
advantage to either side in a criminal proceeding."
274
Article 240 contains no authority for a court to vary that balance, and
where a court attempts to do so, its order will be subject to a writ of
prohibition.275 In Catterson v. Rohl and in Brown v. Appelman,276 the
Appellate Division granted district attorneys' petitions seeking writs of
prohibition as to the discovery orders issued by the respondent-judges, in
that the orders had exceeded Article 240's authority. In Catterson,
specifically, the Second Department not only found that prohibition
against the discovery order was warranted, but added that "the gravity of
the harm which will be suffered 277 if the offending order had been
allowed to stand "compels us to ... grant prohibition. 278 Thus, the
courts recognize and carefully maintain the balance that the legislature
has struck in Article 240, and do not lightly allow it to be disturbed or
interfered with.
It is against this backdrop that we return to Robbins Tire. Not only is
Robbins Tire's applicability to FOIL indisputable,2 79 but it is equally
clear that Robbins Tire's analysis-and therefore FOIL's Interference
272. See N.Y. CIM. PROC. LAW § 240.50.
273. People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222,406 N.E.2d 465 (1980).
274. See McKinney's Sessions Laws, 1979, pg. 1801, Governor's Memorandum,
Chap. 412, L. 1979.
275. See Catterson v. Rohl, 202 A.D.2d 420, 423, 608 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (2d
Dep't 1994); Brown v. Appelman, 241 A.D.2d 279, 284, 672 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377 (2d
Dep't 1998).
276. See id.
277. Id. at 202 A.D.2d at 420, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
278. Catterson, 202 A.D.2d at 424, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 699 (emphasis added); see
also Hynes v Cirigliano, 180 A.D.2d 659, 579 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1992).
279. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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Exemption-is applicable as to attempts to use FOIL to circumvent
Article 240's restrictions.280 While the Court of Appeals, in Gould, did
not find that Article 240 fell within FOIL's Statutory Exemption,281 it
nevertheless cannot be envisioned that the New York legislature, any
more than did Congress with regard to FOIA's relationship to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,282 could have intended FOIL to vitiate
Article 240's function as a discovery scheme-thus rendering Article
240 ineffective from its inception283-or to overrule the long line of
cases dealing with criminal discovery in New York.284 However, that
would be the precise result if it were permissible to use FOIL as a
discovery device in a criminal proceeding.
To reiterate the Supreme Court's finding in Robbins Tire:
disclosure ... would constitute an "interference" ... [if] a party
litigant [receives] earlier and greater access to the
[government's] case than he would otherwise have. .. . [A]
suspected violator with advance access to the [government's]
case could "construct defenses which would permit violations to
go unremedied. 285
Similarly, as the Court of Appeals noted in Fink v. Lejkowitz,
"[h]owever beneficial its thrust, the purpose of the Freedom of
Information Law is not to enable persons to use agency records ... to
construct a defense to impede a prosecution." 286 Thus, pursuant to the
Supreme Court's analysis in Robbins Tire and its applicability to FOIL,
the use of FOIL as a criminal discovery tool is exactly the type of
280. See, e.g., supra note 258 and accompanying text (clarifying Exemption
7(A)'s applicability to criminal proceedings).
281. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at274, 657N.E.2d at 811.
282. See, e.g., supra note 260 and accompanying text.
283. But see N.Y. STATUTES § 144 (statutes will not be construed as to render
them ineffective); cf. Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 93 N.Y.2d 145, 710
N.E.2d 1072, 688 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1999) (where the Court rejected the possibility that the
legislature could have intended that a statutory scheme-here, Civil Rights Law § 50-a-
designed to protect documents from disclosure outside of the specific criteria set forth
therein, could be so easily undermined by such facile means).
284. See, e.g., Pittari v. Pirro, 179 Misc. 2d 241, 683 N.Y.S.2d 700 (records
relating to a pending prosecution are exempt from disclosure under FOIL, as their release
constitutes an interference with a judicial proceeding); accord Title Guarantee v. NLRB,
534 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoted in text accompanying supra note 170).
285. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 241 (citations omitted).
286. Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 572, 393 N.E.2d 463,466 (1979).
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interference contemplated by N.Y. Public Officers Law section
87(2)(e)(i). Therefore, earlier or greater access to materials than would
be available pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 is simply
not permissible under the exemption.
Finally, while it may be argued that New York's criminal discovery
scheme is simply too restrictive,287 this complaint, being one for the
legislature to address if it is to be addressed at all, cannot justify
interference with that carefully balanced scheme. Significantly, that
same criticism had been leveled against the NLRB's discovery
scheme.2 88 Not only did the restrictive nature of the NLRB's scheme fail
to bolster the case for using FOIA as a discovery tool, but it is that very
restrictiveness which makes such unintended access an interference.28 9 In
this regard, the Supreme Court found it to be the NLRB's duty to resist
efforts to use FOIA to circumvent its discovery scheme.2 90 It is difficult
to envision how or why the same duty would not be incumbent upon
New York law enforcement agencies in the face of discovery-type FOIL
requests where a criminal prosecution was in prospect. The Supreme
Court in Robbins Tire found, however, that the very need to put up such
a defense, and its potential impact upon the conduct of the criminal
proceeding-in terms of delay-was itself a form of interference as
well.
291
2. The Agency's Burden of Proof
In Gould, the Court of Appeals issued its reminder that "blanket
exemptions for particular types of documents are inimical to FOIL's
policy of open government 2 92 with regard to its holding that Complaint
Follow-Up Reports are not entitled to blanket exemption as had
previously been held in Scott.29 3 "Instead," the Court noted, "to invoke
one of the exemptions of [N.Y. Public Officers Law section] 87(2), the
287. While open file discovery in criminal proceedings exists in some
jurisdictions, many a FOIL litigant has bemoaned the absence of such in New York.
288. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 236.
289. See id. at 237; cf. Steinberg, 463 F.Supp. at 1274 (where the court analogized
the NLRB's discovery scheme to that of a criminal proceeding).
290. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 238.
291. See id.
292. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
293. Scott v. Chief Medical Examiner, 179 A.D.2d 443, 577 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st
Dep't 1992).
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agency must articulate a 'particularized and specific justification' for not
disclosing requested documents," citing Fink v. Lekowitz. 24 The Court
then remitted "for Supreme Court to determine ... whether the Police
Department can make a particularized showing that any claimed
exemption applies. ' 95 While no such term of art as "particularized
showing" was utilized by the Supreme Court to describe the standard set
forth in Robbins Tire, reconciliation of the Robbins Tire standard with
the particularized showing requirement is not complicated.
The particularized showing requirement, though not precisely
defined in New York case law, was not new when Gould was decided. It
was first articulated in Fink, and was an apparent clarification of an
earlier analysis, in Church of Scientology v. State,296 in which the Court
of Appeals had rejected "conclusory characterizations" as to the records
at issue, regarding which the respondent had failed to tender "any factual
basis on which to determine whether the materials sought ... come
within the exemptions specified in [N.Y. Public Officers Law section
87(2)]." In Washington Post Co. v. New York State Ins. Dept.,297 which
was decided subsequent to Fink, the Court of Appeals again cited Church
of Scientology, for the proposition that the claim of exemption made by
the respondents in that case had been "presented in the form of
conclusory pleading allegations ... without the benefit of evidentiary
support." The Court therefore found that "[c]onsequently, the burden of
proving that the records should be exempted ... has not been met,"
298
further confirming the proposition for which the Fink Court had cited
Church of Scientology when it coined the term "particularized
showing."
2 99
Thus, the particularized showing requirement appears simply to call
for some factual basis, as opposed to mere conclusory characterizations,
upon which a court may find that the materials sought fall within any of
the N.Y. Public Officers Law section 87(2) exemptions, and without
294. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. 46 N.Y.2d 906, 387 N.E.2d 1216 (1979) (emphasis added).
297. 61 N.Y.2d 557, 463 N.E.2d 604 (1984).
298. Id. at 567, 463 N.E.2d at 607-08 (emphasis added).
299. An even more recent FOIL decision, which was rendered by the Appellate
Division, First Department, also cited Church of Scientology for the particularized
showing requirement. See Johnson v. New York City Police Dep't, 257 A.D.2d 343, 346,
694 N.Y.S.2d. 14, 18 (lst Dep't 1999).
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which a respondent fails to carry its burden of proof.30 ° Fink therefore
provides guidance as to the nature of the particularized showing, which
is merely that of a threshold evidentiary requirement (in other words, a
prima facie showing). A closer look reveals that Fink also provides
guidance as to the showing's consistency with the generic category
approach enumerated in RobbinsTire.
With all of the hype that surrounds Gould, it is all too easy to allow
Fink to become lost in the background, and to ignore its importance in
interpreting FOIL. However, Fink, one of the earliest Court of Appeals
decisions regarding the amended version of FOIL,30 1 provides a useful
roadmap to FOIL's interpretation, and one should not fail to recognize its
importance in this regard. Specifically, as relates to the burden of proof
required for an agency to sustain an exemption (i.e., the "showing"),
Fink provided three clues. First, of course, was the articulation of the
particularized showing requirement itself, against the backdrop of
Church of Scientology's rejection of mere conclusory characterizations,
as opposed to some factual connection between the record sought and the
exemption claimed. Second, Fink specifically recognized FOIA as the
federal analogue upon which FOIL had been patterned, and articulated
the significance of FOIA's case law and legislative history in the
interpretation of FOIL.30 2 Thus, within the framework of a single
decision, the Court articulated the standard to be followed, and then
opened the door to an extensive body of case law (pre-existing, as well as
prospective) within which to find guidance as to, inter alia, satisfying
that standard.
The third clue that the Fink Court provided-and the one that ties the
other two together, where the Interference Exemption is concerned-is
Fink's specific citation to Robbins Tire.3 °3 While Robbins Tire was cited
for a proposition different from that with which we are concerned here-
as the Fink Court was not construing the Interference Exemption-the
Court clearly must have been specifically aware of Robbins Tire's
content3° when, after articulating the particularized showing requirement
300. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
301. See L. 1977, ch. 933 (effective January 1, 1978).
302. See Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 393 N.E.2d 463 (1979). This was one
of the most useful pieces of guidance to FOIL's interpretation ever handed down by the
Court.
303. See id. at 571,393 N.E.2d at 465.
304. It is axiomatic that citation to a case indicates actual knowledge of its content
by the Court.
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and then opening the door to the interpretive use of FOIA case law, it
cited that particular decision. Certainly, the Fink Court was, at the
minimum, in concurrence with Robbins Tire's analysis when it found
that "[h]owever beneficial its thrust, the purpose of the Freedom of
Information Law is not to enable persons to use agency records to
frustrate pending or threatened investigations nor to use that information
to construct a defense to impede a prosecution. ' 305 In any event, it must
be observed that even if Fink had not articulated the connection between
FOIL and FOIA, nor specifically cited Robbins Tire, the parallel nature
of the two statutes would still compel the adoption of Robbins Tire's
analysis as to the burden of proof required to sustain the Interference
Exemption under FOIL.0 6 Fink simply makes it inescapable that the
Robbins Tire standard and the particularized showing requirement cannot
be anything but consistent with each other.
At this point, we need inquire no further into the scope or nature of
the particularized showing requirement under the Interference Exemption
or, therefore, Robbins Tire's generic category approach, the consistency
between the two being quite clear. However, it is a sure bet that the
uncontrollable urge will be generated among some 30 7 to argue that
"generic category" simply equates to a "blanket exemption." Although
the ill-defined term "blanket exemption" may thus crop up as a source of
additional confusion in this regard, it should be sufficient to observe that
the Court of Appeals saw the particularized showing as the very
antithesis of the blanket exemption and, therefore, the Robbins Tire
standard's demonstrated consistency with the particularized showing
requirement puts it outside of the reach of such simplistic arguments.
Moreover, just as the New York Court of Appeals found blanket
exemptions to be contrary to the legislative intent behind FOIL,308 the
same was true as to Congress's view of blanket exemptions as applied to
FOIA, and it was this view that specifically led, in part, to FOIA's 1974
amendment. 9 Yet, the generic category approach was not seen by the
Supreme Court as in any way inconsistent with, or violative of
Congress's policy against blanket exemptions. Thus, generic category
305. Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d at 572,393 N.E.2d at 466.
306. See supra Part IV.B.1, for discussion of the parallel statutes doctrine.
307. See, e.g., supra notes 101-06.
308. See Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811.




and blanket exemption are, in fact, opposing concepts, and the two were
explicitly differentiated by the Supreme Court in Robbins Tire.
310
Moreover, Congress itself appears to have found no inconsistency
between its policy against blanket exemptions and the generic category
approach, either. While Congress had not hesitated, in 1974, to legis-
latively overturn prior Supreme Court case law dealing with Exemption
7,311 its subsequent 1986 amendment of FOIA312 -eight years after
Robbins Tire was decided by the Supreme Court-contained no such
disapproval of the Supreme Court's approach, thus indicating its
ratification of the Court's interpretation.313 These two concepts are thus
different, and the generic category approach is therefore consistent with
Congress's intent as to the fundamental scope and operation of FOIA's
Interference Exemption. Based upon the intent of the New York Legis-
lature, that consistency applies to FOIL's Interference Exemption as
well.314 Therefore, the two terms should not be confused or treated
interchangeably under either FOIA or FOIL.
Finally, a simple look at the usage of the term blanket exemption, in
the context of both FOIL and FOIA, actually provides a relatively clear
picture of what is being described. With regard to FOIL, the term
blanket exemption was used to describe a situation where a record was
held to be exempt simply because it was recorded on a particular type of
form (the DD5).315 With regard to FOIA, Congress used the term to
describe a situation where a record was held to be exempt simply
because it was contained in an "investigatory file" even where no
investigation was in prospect, or where the record did not reasonably
pertain to an investigation but had been "commingled" with materials in
such a file.3 16 Under either statute, an exemption might thus have been
claimed even where a particular form or file contained nothing more than
a "nursery rhyme." The term "blanket exemption" therefore appears to
310. See e.g., supra notes 205 & 206 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
312. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-48 (1986).
313. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983) ("In
light of [a] well-established judicial interpretation [of a statutory provision], Congress'
decision to leave [the provision] intact suggests that Congress ratified [the
interpretation].").
314. See Marx v. Bragalini, 6 N.Y.2d 322, 328, 160 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1959); see
also supra Part IV.B.1 (regarding the parallel statutes doctrine).
315. Gould, 89 N.Y.2d at 275, 675 N.E.2d at 811.
316. See Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 228-30.
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describe the application of an exemption where the record itself is
ignored, and its storage medium (whether form or file) becomes the
focus-i.e., the "blanket"-capable of forever shielding any content
from disclosure.317 This is not the case under the generic category
approach, where it is the content of a document which drives the
exemption.1 8
V. CONCLUSION
One noteworthy aspect of J.P. Stevens319 stems from a certain
similarity to Gould. JP. Stevens involved the circuit court's construal of
the EEOC's claim under FOIA's Exemption 3. 320 Essentially, Exemption
3 protects from disclosure (within certain parameters) records which are
specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute.32' In claiming
this exemption, the EEOC had advanced the argument that Title VII,322
the EEOC's authorizing statute, provided for such exemption and
therefore fell within Exemption 3's parameters.323 The circuit court
rejected the EEOC's Exemption 3 claim, though it upheld the claim as to
Exemption 7(A). In Gould, the Court of Appeals observed that Criminal
Procedure Law Article 240 was not an exempting statute within the
meaning of N.Y. Public Officers Law section 87(2)(a), FOIL's parallel
provision to FOIA's Exemption 3.324 However, in similar fashion to the
decision in JP. Stevens, this did not preclude the Gould Court from
holding that access to the documents at issue could still be denied under
FOIL's Law Enforcement Exemption (within which FOIL's Interference
Exemption resides). Also of interest, Gould itself dealt with the very
problem faced by the 1974 Congress which legislatively overturned the
case law that had construed FOIA's Exemption 7 as providing a blanket
317. And that appears to be the gravamen of the Court's displeasure in Gould;
exemptions based upon form (here, the NYPD's DD5s), as opposed to content, are
unacceptable. See e.g., Hanig v. NYS Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 111, 588 N.E.2d
750, 754 (1992) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is as to the nature of the information, not ...
where it appears .... ).
318. AccordHanig, 79 N.Y.2d at 111,588 N.E.2d at 754.
319. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Perry, 710 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983). See also supra
Part V. 1.B.2.iii.
320. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
321. See id.
322. Referring to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
323. JP. Stevens, 710 F.2d at 138.
324. FOIL's version of this exemption, however, is less restrictive than FOIA's.
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exemption from disclosure for material held within an investigative file.
What Congress accomplished by amendment, the New York Court of
Appeals accomplished by judicial decision. Moreover, it is clear that
both Congress and the New York Court of Appeals deemed their
respective offending cases to have been error, and to never have been
reflective of the intent of the respective statutes. It is interesting though
not surprising that parallel statutes, as their respective case law evolves,
experience parallel problems, although their solutions may differ.
At the beginning of this article, several examples of misconception
regarding FOIL and Gould were presented, 25 along with the observation
that precious little direct appellate guidance had (until recently) been
available to clarify matters.326 The analysis contained in this article is
designed to "bridge the gap," so to speak, and to end some of the
confusion surrounding FOIL and Gould that, in the author's experience,
still appears to abound. That is not to say that Robbins Tire's
applicability to FOIL's Interference Exemption, or the proper application
of the particularized showing requirement, have never before been
ascertained. In fact, shortly before this article was submitted for
publication, the Second Department rendered its decision in Pittari v.
Pirro, 3 7-- the first appellate precedent squarely on point as to this
issue-adopting Robbins Tire's analysis when it upheld the denial of a
criminal defendant's FOIL-based article 78 petition for materials relating
to his upcoming trial.3 28 Interestingly, the underlying decision also cited
Church of Scientology-not Gould (or even Fink)-regarding the
government's burden of proof, 29  indicating that court's clear
comprehension of the required showing.
3 0
325. See supra Part I.
326. See supra note 12.
327. 179 Misc.2d 241, 683 N.Y.S.2d 700, affd, 258 A.D.2d 202, 696 N.Y.S.2d
167 (2d Dep't 1999), leave denied, 94 N.Y.2d 755, 723 N.E.2d 567 (1999). The
underlying criminal prosecution involved the notorious murder of the owner of a
horseback riding school by one of her former employees.
328. There is, of course, the distinct possibility that subsequent decisions which
follow Pittari will be appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. A split among New
York's Appellate Departments would certainly increase that likelihood. While this issue
has, therefore, not yet necessarily been laid to rest in New York, there would appear to be
little basis for the Court of Appeals to reject the Second Department's analysis in Pittari,
if and when such an appeal is heard.
329. See Pittari, 179 Misc.2d at 247, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The court agreed with
respondent Pirro's assertion as to the dearth of authority in New York case law on the
issue of using FOIL as a criminal discovery tool, and rejected the petitioner's claim that
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Additionally, even prior to Pittari, one other post-Gould appellate
decision had at least touched on the proper application of FOIL's
Interference Exemption. In Sideri v. Office of the District Attorney, New
York County3 31 the Appellate Division, First Department, noted that even
disclosure of records which had already been used as evidence at trial
would still constitute an interference with the District Attorney's
handling of the criminal-defendant/FOL-petitioner's criminal appeal
proceeding.332 Of some significance, the court was not addressing
specific records but was, therefore, referring generally to a category of
records. Moreover, the full magnitude of this dicta should be clear: if
access to materials relating to a criminal prosecution that have already
been disclosed (at trial) would interfere with an appeal proceeding, it is
axiomatic that an even greater level of interference would be constituted
by access to such materials where they had not been previously disclosed
at all (such as prior to trial).
Thus, it can no longer be said that appellate decisions regarding the
applicability of this exemption to a pending criminal proceeding are
unavailable; but their scarcity333 creates a pressing need for guidance as
Gould allowed for such or that it placed any burden upon the respondent beyond
proffering "a factual basis for the conclusion that the requested documents come within a
statutory exemption" in order to avoid disclosure. Id. Relying on Robbins Tire's analysis,
the court then denied the petition. See id. at 248-51, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 706-08. Accord,
Brown v. New York City Police Dep't, 264 A.D.2d 558, 694 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st Dep't
1999), (observing that, where criminal charges against a FOIL petitioner had been
pending, denial of all police department records relating to his arrest had been proper,
pursuant to FOIL's interference exemption).
330. Accord Johnson v. New York City Police Dep't, 257 A.D.2d 343, 694
N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1999) (where the First Department also cited Church of
Scientology regarding the agency's burden of proof in a FOIL proceeding).
331. 243 A.D.2d 423, 663 N.Y.S.2d 206 (lst Dep't 1997).
332. But see Moore v. Santucci, 151 A.D.2d 677, 543 N.Y.S.2d 103 (2d Dep't
1989) (where the court observed that once a witness testifies in open court, records
containing his statements lose their cloak of confidentiality). Though the First and
Second Departments may seem to differ on this particular point, the First Department, in
Sided, was specifically discussing the Interference Exemption, while the Second
Department, in Moore (based upon the pre-FOIL authority it cites for this point), may
have been speaking of confidentiality in general, thus implicating the confidentiality
provision of FOIL's Law Enforcement Exemption (N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89(2)(e)(iii))
at best. Moore's statement therefore should not be taken as approving "blanket access"
to such records. See supra Part IV.A.
333. See, e.g., Pittari v. Pirro, 179 Misc. 2d 241, 247, 683 N.Y.S. 2d 700, 704-05,
affd 258 A.D.2d 202, 696 N.Y.S.2d 16 (2d Dep't 1999) (citations omitted) ("The
reported decisions on the interplay of the use of FOIL and documents compiled for use in
[Vol. 44
GOULD DEBUNKED
to the exemption's contours. It is hoped that this article has adequately
contributed toward providing some of that guidance. However, the most
critical guidance necessary to this, as well as to almost any other issue
that may arise under FOIL was in fact rendered long ago in Fink v.
Lejkowitz. Fink opens the door to a wealth of FOIA case law and
legislative history, as well as to its application under FOIL. Based upon
Robbins Tire and a broad spectrum of other FOIA cases, there are likely
few issues that can arise under FOIL that have not already been
addressed. As noted in this article's preamble, plenty of guidance
regarding even FOIL's most contentious issue therefore already exists-
one just needs to know where to look for it.
a law enforcement investigation and criminal prosecution have primarily dealt with
requests for disclosure by individuals whose prosecutions have concluded with their
convictions. None of those cases addressed the applicability of Public Officers Law §
87(2)(e)(i) to a pending criminal prosecution."). Accord Legal Aid Soc'y v. New York
City Police Dep't, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Ist Dep't 2000), appeal denied, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS
3925 (N.Y. Dec. 21, 2000). Since Pittari is precisely on point, however, it is certainly
sufficient; and it will remain so unless the Court of Appeals holds otherwise.
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